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FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING' 
The present discussion, while intended to be intrinsically com- 
plete so far as intelligent and convenient perusal is concerned, 
represents, as originally planned, a continuation of an article 
which appeared under the same title more than three years ago.2 
It therefore seems desirable to indicate, in very general form, 
the scope and purpose of the latter. The main divisions were 
entitled: Legal Conceptions Contrasted with Non-legal Concep- 
tions; Operative Facts Contrasted with Evidential Facts; and 
Fundamental Jural Relations Contrasted with One Another. The 
jural relations analyzed and discussed under the last subtitle were, 
at the outset, grouped in a convenient "scheme of opposites and 
correlatives";3 and it will greatly facilitate the presentation of 
the matters to be hereafter considered if that scheme be repro- 
duced at the present point: 
Jural X right privilege power immunity 
Opposites no-right duty disability liability 
Jural X right privilege power immunity 
Correlatives l duty no-right liability disability 
The great practical importance of accurate thought and pre- 
cise expression as regards basic legal ideas and their embodi- 
ment in a terminology not calculated to mislead is not always 
fully realized-especially by the student not yet far advanced in 
'COPYRIGHT, I9I7, by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld. The substance of this 
article, with some expansion and much additional illustrative material 
from judicial opinions, will form part of a volume to appear shortly under 
the same title as that here given. 
2 (9I3) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6, 59. One of the chief purposes of 
this earlier article was to establish a firm foundation for the analysis 
and discussion of complex jural interests, or aggregates of jural rela- 
tions,-the interest of the cestui que trust having been more especially in 
view. See (19I3) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6-20, and notes. This last- 
mentioned subject receives some incidental consideration in the pages 
following; but a more adequate treatment must be reserved for another 
occasion. 
8 See (O9M3) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6, 30 ff., where the individual 
conceptions represented in the scheme are treated at length. 
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his legal work; and it is even true that many an experienced 
lawyer has all too thoughtlessly assumed that those matters 
usually considered in works on so-called "jurisprudence-" are 
merely "academic" in character and devoid of substantial utility 
for the practitioner or judge. In order to dissipate, if possible, 
this fallacious notion-one so demonstrably unfortunate in its 
consequences as regards all departments of the law -the eight 
conceptions represented in the above scheme were analyzed and 
compared in great detail, the purpose having been not only to 
exhibit their intrinsic meaning and scope and their relations to 
'See Mr. Justice Holmes, The Path of the Law (I897) IO HARv. L. 
REV. 456, 474-475: 
"Jurisprudence, as I look at it, is simply law in its most gen- 
eralized part. Every effort to reduce a case to a rule is an effort 
of jurisprudence, although the name as used in English is confined 
to the broadest rules and most fundamental conceptions. One mark 
of a great lawyer is that he sees the application of the broadest 
rules. There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before 
whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for break- 
ing a churn. The justice took time to consider, and then said that 
he had looked through the statutes and could find nothing about 
churns, and gave judgment for the defendant. The same state of 
mind is shown in all our common digests and text-books. Applica- 
tions of rudimentary rules of contract or tort are tucked away 
under the head of Railroads or Telegraphs or go to swell treatises 
on historical subdivisions, such as Shipping or Equity, or are gath- 
ered under an arbitrary title which is thought likely to appeal to 
the practical mind, such as Mercantile Law. If a man goes into 
law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a master of it means to 
look straight through all the dramatic incidents and to discern the 
true basis for prophecy. Therefore, it is well to have an accurate 
notion of what you mean by law, by a right, by a duty, by malice, 
intent, and negligence, by ownership, by possession, and so forth. 
I have in my mind cases in which the highest courts seem to me to 
have floundered because they had no clear ideas on some of these 
themes." 
The following observations of the same learned judge are also deserving 
of consideration: 
"As long as the matter to be considered is debated in artificial 
terms there is a danger of being led by a technical definition to 
apply a certain name, and then to deduce consequences which have 
no relation to the grounds on which the name was applied." Mr. 
Justice Holmes in Guy v. Donald (i9o6) 203 U. S. 399, 406; 27 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 63, 64. 
"It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted 
in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further 
analysis." Mr. Justice Holmes, in Hyde v. United States (I9ii) 
223 U. S. 347, 39I. 
Compare the remarks of Lord Kinnear, in Bank of Scotland v. Macleod 
[1914] A. C. 3II, 324. He there endorses Lord Westbury's declaration 
that "there is not a more fruitful source of error in law than the inac- 
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one another, but also to exemplify the methods, both good and 
bad, by which they are actually applied in judicial reasoning to 
the solution of concrete problems of litigation. The purpose last 
indicated must in the present discussion, as in the former one, be 
the justification for frequent concrete examples of judicial usage, 
and hence for liberal quotations from apposite judicial opinions. 
Instructive examples, whether by way of model or by way of 
warning, must also be drawn occasionally from the works of 
well-known legal authors.5 
In the following pages it is proposed to begin the discussion 
of certain important classifications which are applicable to each 
of the eight individual jural conceptions represented in the above 
scheme. Some of such overspreading classifications consist of 
the following: relations in personam ("paucital" relations), and 
relations in rem ("multital" relations) ; common (or general) 
relations and special (or particular) relations; consensual rela- 
tions and constructive relations; primary relations and secondary 
relations; substantive relations and adjective relations; perfect 
relations and imperfect relations; concurrent relations (i. e., rela- 
tions concurrently legal and equitable) and exclusive relations 
(i. e., relations exclusively equitable)." As the bulk of our statute 
and case law becomes greater and greater, these classifications 
are constantly increasing in their practical importance: not only 
because of their intrinsic value as mental tools for the compre- 
curate use of language," and Lord Mansfield's observation that "nothing 
in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor." The learned judge also 
remarks: 
"The fallacy consists in using legal terms in a popular or meta- 
phorical sense and yet affixing to them all the legal consequences 
which would attach to their use in a strictly technical sense." 
See also, as regards confusion of thought resulting from loose or 
ambiguous legal terms, Field, J., in Morgan v. Louisiana (i876) 93 15. S. 
2I7, 223; and Peckham, J., in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Tennessee (i895) i6i 
U. S. I74, I77, I78. 
'Owing, however, to. limitations of space, it has proved necessary to 
exclude at this time a large part of the available illustrative material 
originally intended to be presented. 
6 For an explanation of the classification of jural relations as "con- 
current" and "exclusive" see the writer's article entitled, The Relations 
between Equity and Law (19I3) II Micn. L. REV. 537, 553, 569. 
See also the article of the writer's friend and colleague, Professor 
Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action-A Reply 
to Professor Williston (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 449, 460 ff. 
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hending and systematizing of our complex legal materials, but 
also because of the fact that the opposing ideas and terms 
involved are at the present time, more than ever before, con- 
stituting part of the formal foundation of judicial reasoning and 
decision.7 Owing to limitations of space the following pages 
will be confined to the first classification above indicated, viz., 
relations in personam and relations in rem. 
The phrases in personam and in rem, in spite of the scope and 
variety of situations to which they are commonly applied, are 
more usually assumed by lawyers, judges, and authors to be of 
unvarying meaning and free of ambiguities calculated to mislead 
the unwary. The exact opposite is, however, true; and this has 
occasionally been explicitly emphasized by able judges whose 
warnings are worthy Qf notice. Thus, in Tyler v. Court of 
Registration,8 Mr. Chief Justice Holmes says, as regards the 
expression, in rem, that "no phrase has been more misused"; 
and in the recent case of Hook v. Hoffman,9 Mr. Justice Franklin, 
in the course of a scholarly opinion involving the nature of 
"proceedings in rem," finds it necessary to characterize the 
expression "Jus in rem" as "somewhat obscure and ambiguous." 
The thoughtful judge last named is, however, kind enough to 
advise us of the one and only remedy for this difficulty, and 
prompt to apply that remedy in his own opinion. His words are 
worthy of quotation: 
"It is no more of a solecism to say immovable personal 
property than it is to say removable fixtures, nor more 
contradicting than in the division of actions to use the 
term 'in rem,' when, under the particular state of facts, 
the action is primarily 'in personal.' In the development 
of the law it is seldom possible, or, when possible, seldom 
'In this sentence the word "formal" must not be ignored; for, in 
emphasizing for the time being the formal and analytical side of legal 
problems, the writer would not be thought to underestimate the great 
importance of other phases of the law, both scientific and practical. He 
has had occasion elsewhere to discuss more comprehensively the funda- 
mental aspects of the law, including historical, or genetic, jurisprudence; 
comparative, or eclectic, jurisprudence; formal, or analytical, jurispru- 
dence; critical, or teleological, jurisprudence; legislative, or constructive, 
jurisprudence; empirical, or functional, jurisprudence.- See A Vital 
School of Jurisprudence and Law, PRoc. OF ASSN. OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS 
FOR 1914, Up. 76-139. 
(1900) 175 Mass. 71, 76. 
(1915) i6 Ariz. 540, 554. 
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expedient, to discard established terms. In this connection 
an observation by Mr. Justice Holmes is peculiarly 
applicable: 
'As long as the matter to be considered is debated in 
artificial terms, there is danger of being led by a technical 
definition to apply a certain name, and then to deduce 
consequences which have no relation to the grounds on 
which the name was applied.' Guy v. Donald, 203 U. S. 
406. 
"Instead of rejecting convenient terms because they 
are ambiguous or not comprehensive, it is better to explain 
their meanings, or, in the language of old Hobbes, 'to 
snuff them with distinctions and definitions,' so as to give 
a better light."'0 
All this being so, we are forced to recognize at the very outset 
that the antithetical pair of expressions, in personam and in rem, 
is constantly being employed as a basis for classifying at least 
four distinct matters; and that the respective meanings of the 
expression in personam and the expression in rem are not the 
same for all of the different situations involved: 
First, we have a fundamental classification of primary rights 
as rights in personal, and rights in rem; Second, there is the 
well-known classification of all judicial proceedings into pro- 
ceedings or actions in personal and proceedings or actions in 
rem; Third, there exists the closely related classification of 
judgments and decrees (and the corresponding jurisdictions of 
courts), some being called judgments or decrees in personal, 
and the others judgments or decrees in rem; Fourth, assuming a 
judgment or decree in personam to have been obtained as the 
result of what may be called the "primary stage" of the typical 
judicial proceeding, the question of its so-called "enforcement"- 
really the "secondary stage" of the judicial proceeding-comes 
into view;" and such enforcement is said to be either in per- 
10 (I9I5) i6 Ariz. 540, 558. 
Compare, as regards the significance and propriety of these terms, 
"primary stage" and "secondary stage" as applied to a suit in equity 
or an action at law, Lord Hardwicke, in Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 
I Ves. 444, 454: 
"As to the court's not enforcing the execution of their judgment; 
if they could not at all, I agree, it would be in vain to make a 
decree; and that the court cannot inforce their own decree in rem, 
in the present case: but that is not an objection against making a 
decree in the cause; for the strict primary decree in this court 
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sonam, as in the case of the typical contempt proceeding employed 
to coerce performance of a decree in equity, or in rem, as in the 
case of the typical execution sale following upon an ordinary 
legal judgment in personal.12 Anyone who has seriously 
observed and reflected on the interrelation of ideas and language 
must realize how words tend to react upon ideas and to hinder 
or control them. More specifically, it is overwhelmingly clear 
that the danger of confusion is especially great when the same 
term or phrase is constantly used to express two or more distinct 
ideas. Professor Holland, having in mind, as regards this 
psychological phenomenon, a particular instance not now before 
us,- viz., the well-known ambiguity of the Latin jus, the German 
Recht, the Italian diritto, and the French droit, terms used to 
indicate both "law" as such and "a right" considered as a 
concrete relation created by law,-does not exaggerate in the 
least when he says: 
"If the expression of widely different ideas by one and 
the same term resulted only in the necessity for these 
clumsy periphrases, or obviously inaccurate paraphrases, 
no great harm would be done; but unfortunately the 
as a court of equity is in personal, long before it was settled, 
whether this court could issue [sic] to put into possession in a suit 
of lands in England; which was first begun and settled in the time 
of James I. but ever since done by injunction or writ of assistant 
to the sheriff: but the court cannot to this day as to lands in 
Ireland or the plantations. In Lord King's time in the case of 
Richardson v. Hamilton, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, which 
was a suit of land and a house in the town of Philadelphia, the 
court made a decree, though it could not be inforced in rem. In 
the case of Lord Anglesey of land lying in Ireland, I decreed for 
distinguishing and settling the parts of the estate, though impossible 
to inforce that decree in rem, but the party being in England, I 
could inforce it by process of contempt in personam and sequestra- 
tion, which is the proper jurisdiction of this court." 
It is interesting to observe that Lord Hardwicke speaks of the writ 
of assistance (under which an equity plaintiff might through the sheriff 
be put into actual possession of land) as a means by which a court of 
equity could at times "enforce in rem" the "strict primary decree in 
personam." 
12 For an able and searching discussion of proceedings in personal and 
proceedings in rem, see the series of articles by Professor Walter Wheeler 
Cook entitled, The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) I5 COL. L. REV. 
37, I o6, 228. 
See also the present writer's article The Relations between Equity and 
Law (1913) II MICH. L. REV. 537, passion. 
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identity of terms seems irresistibly to suggest an identity 
between the ideas which are expressed by them."'-3 
No doubt this psychological and linguistic principle-what 
might be called "the principle of linguistic contamination"- 
explains why certain well-known legal authors have assumed, 
with unfortunate effect on their reasoning and argument, that the 
contrasted pairs of terms in personam and in rem have the same 
intrinsic meaning in each of the four cases above mentioned, and 
therefore represent throughout a precisely similar basis of 
classification; also that there is some formal and symmetrical 
interdependence between the four classifications presented,-e. g., 
that primary rights in rem are such as may be "enforced," or 
vindicated, by proceedings and judgments in rem, or, similarly, 
that primary rights in personam are such as can be "enforced," 
or vindicated, only by actions or proceedings in personam. At 
a later point some of these problems and fallacies will receive 
incidental treatment in connection with the main thread of the 
discussion, and it will thus be possible to give more concrete 
specifications and examples. The chief purpose of the following 
pages is, however, to discuss, directly and exhaustively, only 
the first of the four general classifications above outlined, i. e., 
rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities in per- 
sonam and rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities 
in rem. Substituting what the writer ventures to suggest as 
equivalent and more satisfactory terms for the phrases in per- 
sonam and in rem, we shall have to deal seriatim with eight 
classifications, as follows: i. paucital rights (or claims) and 
multital rights (or claims); 2. paucital privileges and multital 
3Holland, Jurisp. (ioth ed., i906) pp. 8o-8i. 
Compare Austin, Jurisp. (5th ed., i885) Vol. I, pp. 285-286, note, 
referring to the same ambiguity as Holland, and adding: 
"Since the strongest and wariest minds are often ensnared by 
ambiguous words, their (the Germans') confusion of those disparate 
objects is a venial error." 
Compare also Austin, Jurisp., Vol. I, p. 322, note: 
"In the language of English jurisprudence, facts or events which 
are contracts quasi or uti, are styled implied contracts, or contracts 
which the law implies: that is to say, contracts quasi or uti, and 
genuine though tacit contracts, are denoted by a common name, 
or by names nearly alike. And, consequently, contracts, quasi or 
uti, and implied or tacit contracts, are commonly or frequently 
confounded by English lawyers. See, in particular, Sir William 
Blackstone's Commentaries, B. II. Ch. 30. and B. III. Ch. 9." 
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privileges; 3. paucital powers and multital powers; 4. paucital 
immunities and multital immunities; 5. paucital no-rights and 
multital no-rights; 6. paucital duties and multital duties; 7. 
paucital disabilities and multital disabilities; 8. paucital liabilities 
and multital liabilities. Each of these eight definite classifications 
must, for the sake of clearness, receive somewhat separate 
treatment. Owing, however, to limitations of space, the present 
article will deal chiefly with the first subdivision, i. e., paucital 
rights, or claims, and multital rights, or claims. 
As more fully shown in the former article, the word "right" 
is used generically and indiscriminately to denote any sort of legal 
advantage, whether claim, privilege, power, or immunity.'4 In 
its narrowest sense, however, the term is used as the correlative 
of duty ;"5 and, to convey this meaning, the synonym "claim" 
seems the best.'6 In what follows, therefore, the term "right" 
will be used solely in that very limited sense according to which 
it is the correlative of duty. It is hoped that the meaning and 
importance of this needful discrimination may gain in concrete- 
ness and clearness as further details and examples come into view. 
For judicial opinions recognizing the broad and generic significance 
of this term when loosely used, see the authorities discussed in (1913) 23 
YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6, 30 ff. 
Compare also, to similar effect, Slater, J., in Shaw v. Proffitt (i9io) 
57 Or. I92, 20I: 
"It is strenuously urged by defendant's counsel that, under the 
pleadings in this case, plaintiff stands on a bare parol license, which 
he claims to have obtained from the defendant and his predecessors 
in interest and that, therefore, plaintiff is precluded from obtaining 
the full effect of his evidence. We do not agree with such restricted 
interpretation of the language found in the complaint. It is averred 
that plaintiff obtained the 'right' as well as the 'consent, per- 
mission and license of defendant and his predecessors.' The word 
'right' denotes, among other things, 'property,' 'interest,' 'power,' 
'prerogative,' 'immunity,' and 'privilege,' and in law is most fre- 
quently applied to property in its restricted sense." 
See (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6, 3I-32. 
In this connection, the language of Mr. Justice Stayton, though not 
recommended for precision, may well be compared: 
"A right has been well defined to be a well-founded claim, and 
a well-founded claim means nothing more nor less than a claim 
recognized or secured by law. 
"Rights which pertain to persons, other than such as are termed 
natural rights, are essentially the creatures of municipal law, written 
or unwritten, and it must necessarily be held that a right, in a legal 
sense, exists, when in consequence of given facts the law declares 
that one person is entitled to enforce against another a claim 
Mellinger v. City of Huston (i887) 68 Tex. 37, 45; 3 S. W. 249, 253. 
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It is necessary at this point to venture a preliminary explana- 
tion of the division or classification now before us-confessing 
at once that it represents a departure from accepted modes of 
statement or definition on the part of learned authors and judges. 
It will then remain for the more detailed discussion and argument 
to show, if possible, that the currently received explanations are 
not only essentially faulty as regards analysis but also seriously 
misleading for the very practical purpose of solving legal prob- 
lems as swiftly and accurately as possible. 
A paucital right, or claim, (right in personal) is either a 
unique right residing in a person (or group of persons) and 
availing against a single person (or single group of persons)17; 
or else it is one of a few fundamentally similar, yet separate, 
rights availing respectively against a few definite persons.'8 A 
multital right, or claim, (right in rem) is always one of a large 
class of fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and 
potential,'9 residing in a single person (or single group of per- 
sons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a 
very large and indefinite class of people.20 
Probably all would agree substantially on the meaning and 
significance of a right in personam, as just explained; and it is 
easy to give a few preliminary examples: If B owes A a thou- 
sand dollars, A has an affirmative right in personal, or paucital 
right, that B shall transfer to A the legal ownership of that 
amount of money. If, to put a contrasting situation, A already 
1 The words "group of persons" are intended to cover cases of so-called 
"joint" rights and duties. 
8 While the word "paucital" is suggested as the generic term to cover 
all rights in personam, the word "unital" would be available to denote 
that particular kind of right in personam that is "unique" and "uncom- 
panioned." 
19 The reasons for including the words, "actual and potential" must 
be discussed at a later time, after a general consideration of the distinc- 
tion between "actual" and "potential" jural relations. 
'It is not infrequently thought that the word "general" is both appro- 
priate and available to denote those rights, or claims, that are here called 
"multital." See, e. g., Markby, Elements of Law (6th ed., 1905) sec. i65. 
It is submitted, however, that according to the best usage the term 
"general," as applied to a jural relation, indicates that the latter is one 
of a large class of similar relations residing respectively in many persons, 
i. e., people in general. For example, any duty correlating with a multital 
right would be a general, or common, duty. The right of a person not 
to be struck by another is both multital and general. 
This matter will receive more complete consideration at a later time. 
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has title to one thousand dollars, his rights against others in 
relation thereto are multital rights, or rights in rem. In the one 
case the money is owed to A; in the other case it is owned by A.21 
If Y has contracted to work for X during the ensuing six 
months, X has an affirmative right in personam that Y shall 
render such service, as agreed. Similarly as regards all other 
contractual or quasi-contractual rights of this character. On the 
other hand, there may occasionally be rights in personal. of a 
negative tenor or content. Thus if K, a distinguished opera 
singer, contracts with J that the former will not for the next 
three months sing at any rival opera house, J has a negative right 
in personal against K; and the latter is under a correlative 
negative duty. In this, as in other cases of rights in the sense 
of claims, the right of J is but one phase of the total relation 
between J and K, and the duty of K is another phase of the same 
relation,-that is, the whole "right-duty" relation may be 
viewed from different angles. 
In contrast to these examples are those relating to rights, or 
claims, in rem-i. e., multital rights. If A owns and occupies 
Whiteacre, not only B but also a great many other persons- 
not necessarily all persons22-are under a duty, e. g., not to enter 
on A's land. A's right against B is a multital right, or right 
in rem, for it is simply one of A's class of similar, though 
separate, rights, actual and potential, against very many persons. 
The same points apply as regards A's right that B shall not 
commit a battery on him, A's right that B shall not alienate the 
affections of A's wife, and A's right that B shall not manu- 
facture a certain article as to which A has a so-called patent. 
'Compare Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed., 
I905) Vol. II, p. I78. 
' It is sometimes assumed that rights in rem (considered collectively) 
are such only as avail against absolutely all persons,-an idea fostered 
in part by the frequently-used expression "against all the world." See, 
e. g., Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading (2d ed., i883) sec. i84; 
Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (i887) i HARV. L. REV. 6o; 
Hart, The Place of Trusts in Jurisprudence (i9i2) 28 LAW QUART. REV. 
290, 296; Terry, The Arrangement of the Law (I7I7) I7 COL. L. REV. 
365, 376. This notion is not warranted according to general usage. If, 
for example, A, the owner of Blackacre, has given his friends C and D, 
"leave and license" to enter, A has no rights against C and D that they 
shall not enter; but he has such rights against persons in general; and 
they are clearly to be classified as being "multital" or "in rem." 
For further phases of this matter, see ante, p. 7i8 n. I9; post, 
PP. 754-760. 
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Further examples of such negativee23 multital rights will readily 
occur to the reader. Other important instances will require 
detailed consideration from time to time. 
In spite of the formal and abstract explanations already given, 
and in spite of the concrete examples added for merely pre- 
liminary purposes, the effort to give an incisive and compre- 
hensive appreciation of the conceptual and linguistic difficulties 
and dangers involved in the expressions under consideration 
would doubtless fail, at least as regards the inexperienced student, 
unless considerably more were done by way of direct discussion 
of common errors. That is to say, it seems necessary to show 
very concretely and definitely how, because of the unfortunate 
terminology involved, the expression "right in rem" is all too 
frequently misconceived, and meanings attributed to it that could 
not fail to blur and befog legal thought and argument. Some of 
these loose and misleading usages will now be considered in 
detail, it being hoped that the more learned reader will remember 
that this discussion, being intended for the assistance of law 
school students more than for any other class of persons, is made 
more detailed and elementary than would otherwise be necessary. 
(a) A right in rem is not a right "against a thing": In Hook 
v. Hoffman24 we are told by Mr. Justice Franklin, in hopeful 
vein, that "the somewhat obscure and ambiguous expression 
'jus in rem,' when standing by itself, catches a borrowed clear- 
ness from the expression 'jus in personal, to which it is 
opposed."25 This is laudable optimism! It cannot, however, be 
shared by one who has, in the course of many years, observed not 
only the ways and tendencies of many hundreds of intelligent 
students, but also the not unnatural slips of the more learned. 
Any person, be he student or lawyer, unless he has contemplated 
the matter analytically and assiduously, or has been put on notice 
by books or other means, is likely, first, to translate right in 
23 As indicated by the examples given, multital rights are always con- 
structive rather than consensual; that is, they and their correlating 
duties arise independently of even an approximate expression of intention 
on the part of those concerned. This explains, no doubt, why most, if 
not all, of such duties are negative in character: it is just and politic to 
spread such merely negative duties broadcast; whereas precisely the 
opposite would be true in the case of most kinds of affirmative duties. 
24 (19I5) i6 Ariz. 540, 555. 
Compare, for precisely similar language, Austin, Jurisp. (5th ed., 
i885) Vol. II, p. 957. 
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personam as a right against a person; and then he is almost 
sure to interpret right in rem, naturally and symmetrically as he 
thinks, as a right against a thing. Assuming that the division 
represented by in personam and in rem is intended to be mutually 
exclusive, it is plausible enough to assume also that if a right 
in personam is simply a right against a person, a right in rem 
must be a right that is not against a person, but against a thing. 
That is, the expression right in personam, standing alone, seems 
to encourage the impression that there must be rights that are 
not against persons. Then, of course, such a supposed, though 
erroneous, contrast is further encouraged by the prima facie 
literal meaning of the Latin phrase in rem, considered per se; 
for it cannot be assumed that the average person is acquainted 
with the peculiar history and special meaning of that phrase. 
Such a notion of rights in rem is, as already intimated, crude and 
fallacious; and it can but serve as a stumbling-block to clear 
thinking and exact expression. A man may indeed sustain close 
and beneficial physical relations to a given physical thing: he 
may physically control and use such thing, and he may physically 
exclude others from any similar control or enjoyment. But, 
obviously, such purely physical relations could as well exist quite 
apart from, or occasionally in spite of, the law of organized 
society: physical relations are wholly distinct from jural rela- 
tions.26 The latter take significance from the law; and, since 
the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings, 
all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their 
meaning, be predicated of such human beings. The words of 
able judges may be quoted as showing their realization of the 
practical importance of the point now being emphasized: 
i900, Mr. Chief Justice Holmes, in Tyler v. Court of Regis- 
tration :2 
"All proceedings, like all rights, are really against per- 
sons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in rem 
depends on the number of persons affected."28 
2 As to the prevalent and unfortunate tendency to confuse legal and 
non-legal conceptions, see the more general discussion in (1913) 23 YALE 
LAW JOURNAL, I6, 20 ff.; see also post, p. 725, n. 34; and p. 755, n. go. 
2( 900) I75 Mass. 7I, 76. 
'Compare also the following from Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion: 
"It is true as an historical fact that these symbols are used in 
admiralty proceedings, and also, again merely as an historical fact, 
that the proceedings in rem have been confined to cases where 
53 
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i905, Mr. Justice Markby, Elements of Law:29 
"If we attempt to translate the phrase [in rem] liter- 
ally, and get it into our heads that a thing, because rights 
exist in respect of it, becomes a sort of juristical person, 
and liable to duties, we shall get into endless confusion."30 
What is here insisted on,-i. e., that all rights in rem are 
against persons,-is not to be regarded merely as a matter of 
certain classes of claims, although of very divers sorts,-for 
indemnification for injury, for wages, for salvage, etc.,-are to be 
asserted. But a ship is not a person. It cannot do a wrong or 
make a contract. To say that a ship has committed a tort is 
merely a shorthand way of saying that you have decided to deal 
with it as if it had committed one, because some man has committed 
one in fact. There is no a priori reason why any other claim 
should not be enforced in the same way. If a claim for a wrong 
committed by a master may be enforced against all interests in the 
vessel, there is no juridical objection to a claim of title being 
enforced in the same way. The fact that it is not so enforced 
under existing practice affords no test of the powers of the Legis- 
lature. The contrary view Would indicate that you really believed 
the fiction that a vessel had an independent personality as a fact 
behind the law." (1900) I75 Mass. 7I, 77. 
29 (6th ed., I905) sec. i65. 
' To say that all rights, or claims, must be against persons is, of course, 
simply another way of asserting that all duties must be predicated of 
persons. The latter is, in truth, no less obvious than the proposition that 
all rights must be predicated of persons. 
Compare Mr. Justice Markby, in his Elements of Law (6th ed., I905) 
sec. i63: 
"The chief, in my opinion the only, use of a division of law 
into the law of persons and the law of things is as a convenient 
arrangement of topics in a treatise or a code. As used for this 
purpose I shall speak of it hereafter. But by slightly changing the 
terms in which this classification is expressed, Blackstone has 
introduced an important error, which it is desirable to notice here. 
He speaks not of the law of persons and of the law of things, 
but of rights of persons and of rights of things. Rights of per- 
sons there are undoubtedly; for all rights are such. There may be 
also rights over things, and rights over persons; but rights of, 
that is, belonging to, things, as opposed to rights of, that is, 
belonging to, persons, there cannot be." 
Compare also Mr. Justice Henshaw in Western Indemnity Co. v. 
Pillsbury (19I5) 170 Cal. 686, 719: 
"Again it is said that it is thought expedient that the loss by 
injuries to workmen should be borne by the industries and not by 
the men. But this is only a euphemism which obscures the facts 
and darkens reason. It is like other happy catch-phrases that 
deceive the mind by pleasing the ear. We have many such. 
'Putting the rights of property before the rights of men,' is one- 
as though property apart from those of its human owner, ever did 
or could have any rights. So that the rights of property are 
absolutely the rights of men." 
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taste or preference for one out of several equally possible forms 
of statement or definition. Logical consistency seems to demand 
such a conception, and nothing less than that. Some concrete 
examples may serve to make this plain. Suppose that A is the 
owner of Blackacre and X is the owner of Whiteacre. Let it 
be assumed, further, that, in consideration of $ioo actually paid 
by A to B,31 the latter agrees with A never to enter on X's land, 
Whiteacre. It is clear that A's right against B concerning White- 
acre is a right in personal, or paucital right; for A has no 
similar and separate rights concerning Whiteacre availing respec- 
tively against other persons in general. On the other hand, A's 
right against B concerning Blackacre is obviously a right in rem, 
or multital right; for it is but one of a very large number of 
fundamentally similar (though separate) rights which A has 
respectively against B., C, D, E, F, and a great many other per- 
sons. It must now be evident, also, that A's Blackacre right 
against B is, intrinsically considered, of the same general char- 
acter as A's Whiteacre right against B. The Blackacre right 
differs, so to say, only extrinsically, that is, in having many fun- 
damentally similar, though distinct, rights as its "companions." 
So, in general, we might say that a right in personal is one 
having few, if any, "companions"; whereas a right in rem 
always has many such "companions." 
If, then, the Whiteacre right, being a right in personal, is 
recognized as a right against a person, must not the Blackacre 
right also, being, point for point, intrinsically of the same gen- 
eral nature, be conceded to be a right against a person? If not 
that, what is it? How can it be apprehended, or described, or 
delimited at all?. 
If it be said that, as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, 
or claims, against B, C, D, E, and others, various legal privileges 
of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, 
or against" the land, one answer might be that as regards White- 
acre also A has similar privileges against B., C, D, E and all 
others excepting X, the true owner. But the really relevant and 
paramount reply at this point is that we are now dealing only 
with multital rights, or claims, and not with multital privileges. 
The latter will require attention in a later part of the discussion.82 
I" The consideration being actually paid to B, the validity of B's promise 
to A is, of course, not subject to question merely because B was already 
under a similar duty to X. 
" See post, pp. 745-752. 
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It may, however, even at this point be incidentally noticed that 
the general tendency to "confuse" or "blend" legal privileges 
with legal rights, or claims, has doubtless contributed greatly 
to the hazy conception of a right in rem as a right to, over, or 
against a thing. 
For the reasons already given the following passages from 
legal treatises and judicial opinions seem open to question in one 
or more particulars: 
I874, Mr. Stephen Martin Leake, Law of Property in Land: 
"Jurisprudence distinguishes Rights, using the term in 
the strict legal meaning, into the two classes of Rights to 
Things and Rights against Persons, familiarly known in 
the civil law by the terms jura in rem and jura in per- 
sonam. 
"Rights to things, jura in rem, have for their subject 
some material thing, as land or goods, which the owner 
may use or dispose of in any manner he pleases within the 
limits prescribed by the terms of his right. A right of 
this kind imports in all persons generally the correlative 
negative duty of abstaining from any interference with the 
exercise of it by the owner; and by enforcing this duty 
the law protects and establishes the right. But a right of 
this kind does not import any positive duty in any deter- 
minate person, or require any act or intervention of such 
person for its exercise and enjoyment. 
"Rights against persons, jura in personal, on the other 
hand, have for their subject an act or performance of 
some certain determinate person, as the payment of money, 
the delivery of goods and the like. A right of this kind 
imports the correlative positive legal duty in the deter- 
minate person to act in the manner prescribed. It depends 
for its exercise or enjoyment upon the performance of that 
duty, and is secured by the legal remedies provided for a 
breach of performance. . 
"Rights to things, jura in rem, vary and are distin- 
guished according to the things or material subjects in 
the use or disposal of which the right consists."33 
The learned author, whose work is well known to law students 
and highly valued for its general clearness and accuracy, has 
been unfortunate in treating "in rem" as if it meant "to a 
thing'; and it would seem that he was influenced to do this, 
partly at least, as a result of confusing legal privileges and legal 
rights. More than that, this first error has led to an additional 
#Law of Property in Land (ist ed., 1874) pp. I, 2. 
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one: that of conveying the impression that all rights in rem 
(multital rights), in order to be such, must relate to a material 
thing. Such a limitation would exclude not only many rights 
in rem, or multital rights, relating to persons, but also those con- 
stituting elements of patent interests, copyright interests, etc. 
Finally the learned author falls into the error of asserting that 
all rights in personam are affirmative in character; whereas they 
may occasionally be negative, as heretofore seen. 
i9i6, Professor Joseph Henry Beale, Treatise on Conflict of 
Laws: 
"The nature of rights.-The primary purpose of law 
being the creation of rights, and the chief task of the 
Conflict of Laws to determine the place where a right 
arose and the law that created it, a more careful study of 
the nature of rights is of course desirable before the 
examination of actual cases of conflict is begun. . 
"Since we are fortunate enough to have different words 
for these ideas [law and rights] it is all the more neces- 
sary that we should fully understand each of them. 
"A right may be defined as a legally recognized inter- 
est in, to, or against a person or a thing."34 
'Beale, Treatise on Conflict of Laws (I9I6) sec. 139. All will agree 
with Professor Beale that, for accurate thinking and correct results in 
the conflict of laws, it is of vital importance to have sound and consistent 
conceptions of legal rights and other jural relations; and it is evident 
that, pursuant to this idea, much of the learned author's reasoning and 
very many of his arguments and conclusions on specific problems in the 
conflict of laws have, very naturally, been directly based on his "pre- 
liminary survey" of "rights" and on his supposed distinction between 
what he calls "static rights" and what he calls "dynamic rights." 
Yet it may be doubted whether Professor Beale has made clear and 
consistent his conception of a so-called "static right," as "a legally 
recognized interest in, to, or against a person or a thing"; and thus one is 
forced the more to question the validity of many of his arguments and 
conclusions in the closely related fields of jurisprudence and conflict of 
laws. 
At one time the "static right" seems to be a purely factual "interest" 
existing independently of law; at another time a relation "created by law." 
The former idea is suggested when the learned author refers to 
Gareis's definition of "interests." This appears very clearly not only 
from the intrinsic meaning of Gareis's language as quoted by Professor 
Beale, but also from certain introductory words which are to be found 
in Gareis's original work: "Interests, considered as facts, arise directly 
from egoism, and are nothing other than subjectively perceived relations," 
etc. See Gareis, Systematic Survey (Kocourek's translation) p. 31. Indeed, 
Professor Beale himself, in the very definition quoted in the text of the 
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I903, Mr. Herbert Thorndyke Tiffany, Modern Lazw of Real 
Property: 
"Powers of attorney, by which one person is nominated 
as an agent to make a transfer or do some other act in the 
name and stead of the principal, are sometimes spoken 
of as common-law powers. Such an authority, however, 
while it did exist as common law, is entirely different 
from the powers here considered (i. e., powers of appoint- 
ment), since it is merely an agency in the person to whom 
the power is given, authorizing him to execute an instru- 
ment of conveyance or to do some other act in the place and 
stead of his principal, the title passing, not by the power 
of attorney, but by the conveyance subsequently made, 
which is regarded as made by the principal. A power of 
attorney creates merely a contractual relation,-rights in 
personasn,-as does any other contract of agency; while 
a power, such as we here treat of, involving dominion 
over land to a greater or less extent, creates in the person 
to whom the power is given rights in rem of a proprietary 
character."35 
The exact meaning of the learned author is not evident; but 
present article, defines "a right" as an "interest," not as some legal 
relation protecting the interest: there is a very obvious difference-and 
one vitally important for the solution of problems in the conflict of laws- 
between a mere factual interest and its legal recognition (legal claims, 
privileges, etc.). 
In sec. 141, however, we find the following: 
"A static right, or as it is commonly called a vested interest, is a 
legally protected interest in a person or thing. Such an interest is 
one which continues indefinitely, and protection of it therefore 
requires a right which, like the interest it protects, has the character 
of permanence. Accordingly a static right remains in existence 
until either the subject of the interest ceases to exist or the law 
itself by a special act puts an end to the right." 
In this passage we are told first, that a "static right" is an interest; 
second, that the "right" is something other than "the interest it protects"; 
third, that "a static right remains in existence until . . . . the law 
itself . . . . puts an end to the right." 
A similar sudden and difficult shift seems to occur in sec. i42. Thus: 
"A static right, as has been seen, is the interest of a person in a 
thing or in a person; the right is created by law, and once created it 
is permanent, that is, it persists until the proper law puts an end to 
it. The law that creates it, as will be seen, also provides for its 
preservation, by creating a hedge of protecting rights about it; 
rights of the owner or possessor to have it free from interference 
or destruction. . It is to be regarded as a legal entity quite 
apart from the particular protection with which it may be endued 
by law." 
'~Modern Law of Real Property (i9o3) sec. 273. 
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it seems clear that the power of an agent to convey Whiteacre 
is not intrinsically different, so long as it endures, from a power 
to convey Whiteacre in exercise of a so-called power of appoint- 
ment. It is true that the agent is subject to a liability of having 
his power "revoked" or divested by the principal, whereas the 
power of appointment is subject to no similar liability at the 
hands of anyone. But this difference, conceding its great im- 
portance, is, of course, not accurately expressed by asserting 
that the power of attorney creates rights in personal, and the 
power of appointment "creates in the person to whom the power 
is given rights in rem of a proprietary character." In truth the 
creation of a power of agency does not necessarily involve any 
contract rights against the principal or any one else.36 The fact 
seems to be that the greater "staying" quality of the power of 
appointment (as compared with the power of agency) has sug- 
gested to the author greater "adhesiveness" or "thingness," 
and hence caused the inappropriate terms now under review. 
Further critical consideration of the last-quoted passage will 
be desirable in connection with the subject of immunities in 
personam and immunities in rem. 
i828, Sir Thomas Plumer, M.R., in Dearle v. Hall: 
"They say, that they were not bound to give notice to 
the trustees; for that notice does not form part of the 
necessary conveyance of an equitable interest. I admit, 
that, if you mean to rely on contract with the individual, 
you do not need to give notice; from the moment of 
the contract, he, with whom you are dealing, is personally 
bound. But if you mean to go further, and to make 
your right attach upon the thing which is the subject of 
the contract, it is necessary to give notice; and, unless 
notice is given, you do not do that which is essential in 
all cases of transfer of personal property. . . . Notice, 
then, is necessary to perfect the title,-to give a complete 
right in rem, and not merely a right as against him who 
conveys his interest."37 
This passage from Dearle v. Hall will require further treat- 
ment in connection with the subject of immunities in personam 
and immunities in rem. 
i857, Mr. Justice Cutting, in Redington v. Frye: 
"But a sub-contractor has no claim against the owner 
of the property-his claim is only against the property 
WSee Huffcut, Agency (2d ed., i9oi) sec. IO. 
' (1828) 3 Russ. I, 22, 24. 
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(in rem), and the person and property of his employer 
(in personal).".38 
The preceding quotations from legal treatises and judicial 
opinions have been presented, as is evident, for the purpose of 
exemplifying the less careful and exact use of terms that we 
sometimes find, and for the further purpose of indicating the 
confusion of thought that is likely to result in such cases. Over 
against these will now be considered various passages from legal 
treatises and judicial opinions exemplifying more precise modes 
of thought and expression. It is desirable to begin with Austin; 
for his work on Jurisprudence was the first to give prominence 
to the terms right in rem and right in personal among English- 
speaking lawyers and authors, and his language has become 
classical in its importance: 
i832, Professor John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or 
The Philosophy of Positive Law: 
"The distinction between Rights which I shall presently 
endeavour to explain, is that all-pervading and important 
distinction which has been assumed by the Roman Insti- 
tutional Writers as the main groundwork of their arrange- 
ment: namely, ,the distinction between rights in rem and 
rights in personal; or rights which avail against persons 
generally or universally, and rights which avail exclusively 
against certain or determinate persons.38 
(i857) 43 Me. 578, 587. 
3The pair of terms, "jus in personal and "jus in rem" as contrasted 
with the pair of terms, actiono in personal" and actiono in rem," was not 
in general use among the Roman jurists. Compare Clark, History of 
Roman Law: Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p. 71: "Jus in rem and Jus in re in 
Roman Law. The former of these expressions is very little used by 
the Roman Jurists, but, in the few passages in which it occurs, res clearly 
means the thing itself as distinguished e. g. from its value. (See Ulpian, 
Dig. 32. 20. Nullum quidem jus in ipsam rem habere, sed actionem de 
pretio. Cf. Goudsmit, 247 n.)" 
It is clear, therefore, that the "all-pervading and important" Roman law 
distinction to which Austin refers was that represented by obligatio and 
dominium. Compare Austin, Jurisp. (5th ed., i885) Vol. I, p. 383: "By 
jus in rem and jus in personal, the authors of those terms intended to 
indicate this broad and simple distinction; which the Roman lawyers 
also marked by the words dominium and obligatio-terms the distinction 
between which was the groundwork of all their attempts to arrange rights 
and duties in an accurate or scientific manner." Also Austin, Jurisp., 
Vol. II, p. 773: "The first great distinction among primary rights has been 
very fully explained in a preceding part of this Course. I allude to the 
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"The terms 'jus in rem' and 'jus in personal' were 
devised by the Civilians of the Middle Ages, or arose in 
times still more recent. 
"The phrase in rem denotes the compass, and not the 
subject of the right. It denotes that the right in question 
avails against persons generally; and not that the right 
in question is a right over a thing. For, as I shall show 
hereafter, many of the rights, which are jura or rights 
in rem, are either rights over, or to, persons, or have no 
subject (person or thing). 
"The phrase in personal is an elliptical or abridged 
expression for 'in personam certam sive determinatam.' 
Like the phrase in rem, it denotes the compass of the 
right. It denotes that the right avails exclusively against 
a determinate person, or against determinate persons."4? 
Additional explanations of ideas and terms and further in- 
structive examples of usage are to be found in the following 
utterances of able judges: 
I87I, Mr. Justice Markby, Elements of Law: 
"The term 'right in rem' is a very peculiar one; trans- 
lated literally it would mean nothing. The use of it in 
conjunction with the term 'in personal' as the basis of 
a classification of actions in the Roman law has been 
explained above, and its meaning will be further illus- 
trated by two passages in the Digest of Justinian. In 
Book iv. tit. 2. sec. 9, the rule of law is referred to- 
that what is done under the influence of fear should not 
be binding: and commenting on this it is remarked, that 
the lawgiver speaks here generally and 'in rem,' and does 
not specify any particular kind of persons who cause 
the fear; and that therefore the rule of law applies, 
whoever the person may be. Again, in Book xliv. tit. 4. 
sec. 2, it is laid down that, in what we should call a plea 
of fraud, it must be specially stated whose fraud is com- 
plained of, 'and not in rem.' On the other hand, it is 
pointed out that, if it is shown whose fraud is complained 
of, it is sufficient; and it need not be said whom the fraud 
was intended to injure; for (says the author of the 
Digest) the allegation that the transaction is void, by 
reason of the fraud of the person named, is made 'in 
rem.' In all these three cases 'in rem' is used as an 
adverb, and I think we should express as nearly as 
distinction between dominia and obligationes, as they were called by the 
classical jurists; between jura in rem and jura in personal, as they 
have been styled by modern Civilians." 
'4Jurisp. (5th ed., i885) Vol. I, pp. 369, 370. 
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possible its exact equivalent, if we substituted for it 
the English word 'generally.' In the phrase 'right in 
rem' it is used as an adjective, and the equivalent English 
expression would be a 'general right'; but a more ex- 
plicit phrase is a 'right availing against the world at 
large': and if this, which is the true meaning of the 
phrase 'right in rem,' be carefully remembered, no 
mistake need occur."'41 
i883, Mr. Justice Mulkey, in W., St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. 
Shacklet: 
"One of the primary rights of the citizen, sanctioned by 
the positive law of the State, is security to life and limb, 
and indemnity against personal injuries occasioned by the 
negligence, fraud or violence of others. This is a right 
which avails against all persons whomsoever, and is dis- 
tinguished from a right which avails against a par- 
ticular individual or a determinate class of persons. The 
former is called a right in rem, the latter a right in per- 
sonam. The former class of rights exists independently of 
contract; the latter frequently arises out of contract.... 
"So in the present case, appellee's intestate had a right 
in rem, or a general right, which entitled him, if free from 
fault himself, to be protected and indemnified against in- 
juries resulting from the negligence of all persons whom- 
soever, including the appellant. . . ."42 
i886, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Hogan v. Barry: 
"There is no doubt that an easement may be created by 
words sounding in covenant. Bronson v. Coffin, io8 Mass. 
I75, i8o. If the seeming covenant is for a present enjoy- 
ment of a nature recognized by the law as capable of being 
conveyed and made an easement,-capable, that is to say, 
of being treated as a jus in rem, and as not merely the 
subject of a personal undertaking,-and if the deed dis- 
closes that the covenant is for the benefit of adjoining 
land conveyed at the same time, the covenant must be 
construed as a grant, and, as is said in Plowden, 308, 'the 
phrase of speech amounts to the effect to vest a present 
property in you.' An easement will be created and 
attached to the land conveyed, and will pass with it to 
assigns, whether mentioned in the grant or not."43 
'4 Elements of Law (6th ed., 1905) sec. i65. 
42 (i883) 105 III. 364, 379. 
' 
(i886) 143 Mass. 538. 
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I903, Mr. Justice Holmes, in International Postal Supply Co. 
v. Bruce: 
"As the United States could not be made a party the 
suit failed. In the case at bar the United States is not 
the owner of the machines, it is true, but it is a lessee in 
possession, for a term which has not expired. It has a 
property, a right in rem, in the machines, which, though 
less extensive than absolute ownership, has the same inci- 
dent of a right to use them while it lasts."44 
i904, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. 
Baltimore: 
"In the next place, as to the interest of the United States 
in the land. This is a mere condition subsequent. There 
is no easement or present right in rem. The obligation to 
keep up the dock and to allow the United States to use 
it carries active duties and is purely personal. . .. The 
United States has no present right to the land, but merely 
a personal claim against the corporation, reinforced by a 
condition."'45 
I905, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Muhlker v. Harlem R. R. Co.: 
"What the plaintiff claims is really property, a right in 
rem. It is called contract merely to bring it within the 
contract clause of the Constitution."46 
I913, Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, in Attenborough v. 
Solomon: 
"But the question which goes to the root of this case is 
one which renders such a proposition wholly beside the 
point. If I am right, there is no question here of an 
executor acting in the execution of his powers, so far as 
this residue is concerned. The executors had long ago 
lost their vested right of property as executors and become, 
so far as the title to it was concerned, trustees under the 
will. Executors they remained, but they were executors 
who had become diverted, by their assent to the dispositions 
of the will, of the property which was theirs virtute officii; 
and their right in rem, their title of property, had been 
transformed into a right in personam,-a right to get the 
4" (i903) i94 U. S. 6oi, 6o6. 
(1904) I95 U. S. 375, 382. 
(4 905) 197 U. S. 544, 575. 
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property back by proper proceedings against those in 
whom the property should be vested if it turned out that 
they required it for payment of debts for which they had 
made no provision."47 
I9I4, Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor, in Sinclair v. 
Brougham: 
"The difficulty of establishing a title in rem in this case 
arises from the apparent difficulty of following money. 
In most cases money cannot be followed. When sov- 
ereigns or bank notes are paid over as currency, so far 
as the payer is concerned, they cease ipso facto to be the 
subjects of specific title as chattels. If a sovereign or 
bank note be offered in payment it is, under ordinary cir- 
cumstances, no part of the duty of the person receiving it 
to inquire into title. The reason of this is that chattels 
of such a kind form part of what the law recognizes as 
currency, and treats as passing from hand to hand in point, 
not merely of possession, but of property. It would 
cause great inconvenience to commerce if in this class of 
chattel an exception were not made to the general require- 
ment of the law as to title.... 
"That seems to be, so far as the doctrine of the common 
law is concerned, the limit to which the exception to the 
rule about currency was carried; whether the case be 
that of a thief or of a fraudulent broker, or of money 
paid under mistake of fact, you can, even at law, follow, 
but only so long as the relation of debtor and creditor has 
not superseded the right in rem."48 
I9I4, Lord Sumner, in Sinclair v. Brougham: 
"Analogous cases have been decided with regard to 
chattels. They differ, no doubt, because of the fact that 
the property in the chattels remained unchanged, though 
identification and even identity of the subject-matter of 
the property failed, whereas here, except as to currency, 
and even there only in a restricted sense, the term property, 
as we use that term of chattels, does not apply, and, at 
least as far as intention could do it, both depositors and 
shareholders had given up the right to call the money 
or its proceeds their own, and had taken instead personal 
claims on the society."49 
4 [1913] A. C. 76, 85. 
8 [ 1914] A. C. 398, 4i8, 4I9. 
4 [I9I4] A. C. 398, 458. 
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i9i6, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Kryger v. Wilson: 
"If the plaintiff in error had not submitted himself to 
the jurisdiction of the court, the decree could have deter- 
mined only the title to the land, and would have left him 
free to assert any personal rights he may have had under 
the contract."" 
(b) A multital right, or claim, (right in rem) is not always 
one relating to a thing, i. e., a tangible object: If the preceding 
discussion has served its various purposes, it must now be 
reasonably clear that the attempt to conceive of a right in rem 
as a right against a thing should be abandoned as intrinsically 
unsound, as thoroughly discredited according to good usage, and, 
finally, as all too likely to confuse and mislead. It is desirable, 
next, to emphasize, in more specific and direct form, another 
important point which has already been incidentally noticed: that 
a right in rem is not necessarily one relating to, or concerning, 
a thing, i. e., a tangible object. Such an assumption, although 
made by Leake and by many others who have given little or no 
attention to fundamental legal conceptions, is clearly erroneous. 
The term right in rem (multital right) is so generic in its denota- 
tion as to include: i. Multital rights, or claims, relating to a 
definite tangible object: e. g., a landowner's right that any 
ordinary person shall not enter on his land, or a chattel owner's 
right that any ordinary person shall not physically harm the 
object involved,-be it horse, watch, book, etc. 2. Multital rights 
(or claims) relating neither to definite tangible object nor to 
(tangible) person, e. g., a patentee's right, or claim, that any 
ordinary person shall not manufacture articles covered by the 
patent; 3. Multital rights, or claims, relating to the holder's 
own person, e. g., his right that any ordinary person shall not 
strike him, or that any ordinary person shall not restrain his 
physical liberty, i. e., "falsely imprison" him; 4. Multital rights 
residing in a given person and relating to another person, e. g., 
the right of a father that his daughter shall not be seduced, or 
the right of a husband that harm shall not be inflicted on his 
wife so as to deprive him of her company and assistance; 5. 
Multital rights, or claims, not relating directly to either a 
(tangible) person or a tangible object, e. g., a person's right 
that another shall not publish a libel of him, or a person's right 
'? (I9x6) 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. X, 35. 
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that another shall not publish his picture,-the so-called "right 
of privacy" existing in some states, but not in all. 
It is thus seen that some rights in rem, or multital rights, relate 
fairly directly to physical objects; some fairly directly to persons; 
and some fairly directly neither to tangible objects nor to persons. 
It is, however, important to observe that there is a more specific 
Latin term, jus in re, which has been frequently used by able 
judges to indicate jural relations in rem (i. e., multital rights, 
privileges, powers, and immunities) directly concerning a tangible 
object, such as a piece of land, a vessel, etc. This form of expres- 
sion. appears to have been used by the classical Roman jurists 
almost exclusively in the more specific combination, jus in re 
alien (easements, profits, etc.), as contrasted with jus in re 
propria; but the more generic jus in re was freely employed by 
the modem civilians,-especially in opposition to a particular kind 
of jus in personal called jus ad rem.51 The following explana- 
tions and examples of modem usage by able judges are worthy 
of careful and critical consideration: 
i87i, Mr. Justice Markby, Elements of Law: 
"It is necessary to distinguish carefully between a right 
in rem and a (so-called) real right. A real right is a 
right over a specific thing (a jus in re, as will be ex- 
plained hereafter). Thus a right of ownership is a real 
right; it is also a right in rem. But a right. to personal 
safety is not a real right, though it is a right in rem. "52 
I9I4, Lord Dunedin, in Sinclair v. Brougham: 
"The case of a chattel is easy: A shopkeeper delivers 
an article at the house of B. in mistake for the house of A. 
An action would lie against B. for restitution. Such an 
action could easily be founded on the right of property. 
To use the Roman phraseology, there would be a jus in re. 
And where there was a jus in re there would not be, I take 
' That is, if A has a right in personam against B that the latter shall 
"transfer" some "legal interest," e. g., title of Blackacre, to A, A is 
said to have only a jus ad rem; whereas after conveyance made by B, 
A would have jus in re. 
For very interesting instances of the use of the terms jus in re and 
jus ad rem in connection with attempts to explain the nature of uses and 
trusts, see Bacon, Uses (Circa i602) Rowe's ed., pp. 5-6; Co. Lit. (i628) 
P. 272 b. 
Both of these passages are quoted in (0913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6, 
notes i and 2. 
' Elements of Law (6th ed., 1905) 99, note. 
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it, any difficulty in finding a form of common law action 
to fit the situation. But the moment you come to deal 
with what in Roman phraseology is called a fungible, and 
especially when you deal with money, then the jus in re 
may disappear, and with it the appropriateness of such 
common law action. The familiar case is the paying of 
money by A. to B. under the mistaken impression in fact 
that a debt was due, when in truth there was no debt due. 
It was to fit cases of this sort that the common law evolved 
the action for money had and received."53 
1914, Lord Kinnear, in Bank of Scotland v. Macleod: 
"But to extend Lord Westbury's phrase so as to make 
it cover personal obligations which do not affect the real 
right of the obligor seems to me altogether extravagant. 
It was maintained in argument that every obligation with 
reference to any property or fund which involves a lia- 
bility to account fell within the principle. If that were 
so every imperfect security, however invalid as a real 
right, would be effectual as a trust."54 
1855, Mr. Justice B. R. Curtis, in The Young Mechanic: 
"But I will first inquire what right or interest is con- 
ferred by the statute, provided it intended to create such 
a lien, as exists by the general admiralty law upon foreign 
vessels. 
"Though the nature of admiralty liens has doubtless 
been long understood, it does not seem to have been 
described with fulness and precision, in England or this 
country. That it differs from what is called by the same 
name in the common law, is clear; for it exists inde- 
pendent of possession. The Bold Buccleugh, 22 Eng. L. 
& Eq. 62; The Nestor, I Sumn. 73. That it is not iden- 
tical with equitable liens, is equally clear; for the latter 
arise out of constructive trusts, and are neither a jus ad 
rem, or a jus in re; but simply a duty, binding on the 
conscience of the owner of the thing, and which a Court 
of Equity will compel him specifically to perform. 2 
Story's Eq. Jurisp. ? I2I7; Ex parte Foster, 2 Story, 
R. 145; Clarke v. Southwick, i Curtis, 299. . . 
"In my opinion the definition given by Pothier of an 
hypothecation is an accurate description of a maritime lien 
under our law. 'The right which a creditor-has in a thing 
of another, which right consists in the power to cause that 
' [1914] A. C. 398, 43I. 
" [1914] A. C. 3II, 324. 
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thing to be sold, in order to have the debt paid out of the 
price. This is a right in the thing, a jus in re.' TraitW de 
l'Hypotheque, art. prelim. See also, Sanders's Justinian, 
page 227. . . 
"Whether he can make the seizure himself, only to be 
followed by a judicial sale, or must resort to a court for 
both, may be important as to remedy, but does not affect 
his ultimate and essential right . . 
"Though tacitly created by the law, and to be executed 
only by the aid of a court of justice, and resulting in a 
judicial sale, it is as really a property in the thing as the 
right of a pledgee or the lien of a bailee for work. The 
distinction between a jus in re and a jus ad rem was 
familiar to lawyers of the middle ages, and is said then 
to have first come into practical use, as the basis of the 
division of rights into real and personal. Sanders' Intro. 
to Just. p. 49. A jus in re is a right, or property in a 
thing, valid as against all mankind. A jus ad rem is a 
valid claim on one or more persons to do something, by 
force of which a jus in re will be acquired. Pothier, 
Traite' du Droit de Domaine, ch. Pretences; Hugo, His. 
du Droit Rom. vol. i, p. II8. 
"My opinion is, that the lien conferred by the local law 
was an existing encumbrance on the vessel, not divested 
or extinguished by the death or insolvency of the owner; 
and that, consequently, the decree of the District Court 
must be affirmed."55 
i90o, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, in The Carlos F. Roses: 
"The right of capture acts on the proprietary interest 
of the thing captured at the time of the capture and is not 
affected by the secret liens or private engagements of the 
parties. Hence the prize courts have rejected in its favor 
the lien of bottomry bonds, of mortgages, for supplies, 
and of bills of lading. The assignment of bills of lading 
transfers the jus ad rem, but not necessarily the jus in rem. 
The jus in re or in rem implies the absolute dominion,- 
the ownership independently of any particular relation 
with another person. The jus ad rem has for its founda- 
tion an obligation incurred by another. Sand. Inst. Just. 
Introd., xlviii; 2 Marcade, Expl. du Code Napoleon, 350; 
2 Bouvier, (Rawle's Revision), 73; The Young Mechanic, 
2 Curtis, 404. 
"Claimants did not obtain the jus in rem, and, according 
to the great weight of authority, the right of capture was 
superior." 6 
X (I85j) 2 Curtis, 404, 406, 410, 411, 412, 414. 
5" (I900) 177 U. S. 655, 666. 
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i870, Mr. Justice Foster, in Jacobs v. Knapp: 
"That statute provides that 'any person who labors at 
cutting, hauling, or drawing wood, bark, logs, or lumber, 
shall have a lien thereon for his personal services, which 
lien shall take precedence of all other claims except liens 
on account of public taxes, to continue sixty days after the 
services are performed, and may be secured by attachment.' 
"At the common law the lien of a mechanic, manufac- 
turer, or other laborer 'is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus 
in re: that is to say, it is not a right of property in the 
thing itself, or a right of action to the thing itself;' but 
it is a security, derived from a 'general principle of the 
common law, which gives to a man who has the lawful 
possession of a thing and has expended his money or his 
labor upon it, at the request of the owner, a right to retain 
it until his demand is satisfied.' 
"A lien, as we have seen, is a personal right, as well 
as an interest which can only be created by the owner, 
or by his authority. If Fifield, by virtue of his contract 
with the defendants, had a lien upon the wood, the plaintiff 
could acquire no lien upon the property through him. 
The plaintiff, as a creditor of Fifield, could not attach and 
hold, as against the owner, at the common law, the prop- 
erty in which Fifield had but the qualified interest of a 
pledgee. Lovett v. Brown, 40 N. H. 5Ii. Neither is a 
lien for the price of labor performed on an article assign- 
able. Bradley v. Spofford, 23 N. H. 447. 
"The statutes of liens have enlarged the privileges of 
the party who, at common law, could only as bailee avail 
himself of the lien, by substituting, in the enumerated 
cases, attachment of the property for retention of posses- 
sion; but it would be quite anomalous to regard this 
process of attachment as applying in favor of a stranger 
against a party with whom the plaintiff never contracted, 
and who could in no proper sense be regarded as an 
attaching creditor. . . ."57 
The passage from Mr. Justice Foster-the last of the above 
quotations-seems open to comment. If at common law the lien 
of the mechanic, manufacturer or other laborer consists of the 
"right to retain" the "thing" in his possession or, to use Mr. 
Justice Foster's own later and more discriminating term, a 
"privilege" of retaining possession, this is certainly a "privi- 
lege" relating to a "thing." More than that, such privileges 
are multilal privileges, or privileges in rem, existing not only 
It (i870) 50 N. H. 71, 75. 
54 
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against the owner of the chattel but also against all persons in 
general, and correlating with no-rights in the latter. These 
multital privileges relate directly to the physical "thing"; and 
they are "rights" in the very broad sense of that term. It is 
difficult, therefore, to see why the term jus in re should not be 
applicable. For the latter term does not seem to be confined to 
rights in the sense of claims, this being shown by the above- 
quoted opinion of Mr. Justice Curtis, whose characterization of 
common-law liens differs from that of Mr. Justice Foster. It 
is also clear that the lienor has, by virtue of his possession per se, 
rights in rem against all others that they shall not disturb that 
possession or harm the -object possessed. These last are rights 
or claims literally relating to the thing; and, therefore, so far 
at least as the literal meaning of jus in re is concerned there seems 
to be no reason why the latter expression should not be applied. 
It is true that if the lienor were to surrender possession he would 
thereby divest himself of his privilege (against the owner) and 
his rights, or claims, against the owner and others; but while 
those relations exist they concern the thing, and that fact is 
obviously not negatived by the possibility of their being divested. 
The passage last quoted from Mr. Justice Markby and also 
the extracts from the opinions of Lord Kinnear and Mr. Justice 
Curtis show that those rights in rem which directly relate to 
things-land, vessels, etc.-instead of being called jus in re are, 
occasionally denominated "real"-a term meaning literally, of 
course, "relating to a thing." "Real rights" in this sense are 
opposed to rights in personal relating to things. Thus, e. g., 
if A is owner of a horse, he has jus in re or "real rights"; if, 
on the other hand, X is under contract to transfer the ownership 
of a horse to A, the latter has that sort of right in personam 
which would sometimes be called jus ad rem, or "personal right." 
In the restricted sense now referred to, it seems clear that real 
rights as a class also exclude both rights in personam and rights 
in rem that do not relate directly to things, or tangible objects. 
The following passages may be considered with advantage: 
19I4, Professor E. C. Clark, History of Roman Lacw: Juris- 
prudence: 
"Jura realia and personalia are expressions occasionally 
used by modern civilians as adjectival forms for jura in 
rem and in personal, but only as confined to Property 
Law. (E. G., the translator of Mackeldey, Pr. ii. ? I5. 
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Austin (T. and N. ii. 5, pp. 977, 978; St. Note on Lect. 
I4, p. i84) identifies the pairs without the above qualifi- 
cation.) This at least seems to be the meaning given by 
Savigny to jura realia, if represented by the correspond- 
ing German dingliche Rechte. (System, i, ? 56, p. 369. 
Alle mogliche Rechte an Sachen . ... fassen wir 
unter dem gemeinsamen Namen der dinglichen Rechte 
zusammen.) ",58 
I855, Mr. Justice B. R. Curtis, in The Young Mechanic: 
"The distinction between a jus in re and a jus ad rem 
was familiar to lawyers of the middle ages, and is said 
then to have first come into practical use, as the basis of 
the division of rights into real and personal. Sanders' 
Intro. to Just. p. 49. A jus in re is a right, or property in 
a thing, valid as against all mankind. A jus ad rem is a 
valid claim on one or more persons to do something, by 
force of which a jus in re will be acquired. Pothier, Traiti 
du Droit de Domaine, ch. Pretences; Hugo, His. du Droit 
Rom. vol. i, p. II8. 59 
I9I4, Lord Kinnear, in Bank of Scotland v. Macleod: 
"But to extend Lord Westbury's phrase so as to make 
it cover personal obligations which do not affect the real 
right of the obligor seems to me altogether extravagant. 
It was maintained in argument that every obligation with 
reference to any property or fund which involves a lia- 
bility to account fell within the principle. If that were so 
every imperfect security, however invalid as a real right, 
would be effectual as a trust."60 
Even when restricted as above indicated, the pair of terms, 
"real" and "personal," seems an undesirable one for English- 
speaking lawyers and judges because those words are already 
definitely appropriated to different and independent classifications 
and are constantly applied in connection with the latter. Thus, 
e. g., we have "real property" and "personal property"; and this 
classification is obviously not parallel with that of "real rights" 
and "personal rights"-both of the latter terms being applicable 
either to "personal property" relations or to "real property" 
relations. Then too, the expression "personal rights" is espe- 
"8History of Roman Law: Jurisprudence (1914) Vol. II, p. 7i8. 
6 (i855) 2 Curtis, 404, 412. 
' [1914] A. C. 3II, 324. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 17:35:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
740 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
cially misleading in its connotation because, literally, it tends to 
suggest rights concerning a person as the object to which the 
rights relate, that is, either the person who holds the rights or 
some other person. It is therefore most fortunate that the pair 
of terms, "'real rights" and "personal rights," is not at all com- 
mon in judicial opinions or in legal treatises. Over against this, 
however, it must be recognized that courts not infrequently use a 
somewhat similar pair of terms, viz., the expression "'personal 
rights" or "personal claims" in opposition to some such expres- 
sion as "property rights," "title to land," "interest in the thing," 
etc."' 
Finally, as regards this particular matter, it must be regretted 
that some authors, though no courts whatever so far as has been 
observed, use the terms "real rights" and "personal rights" 
as exact equivalents, respectively, for all kinds of rights in rem 
(whether relating directly to things or persons or to neither) 
and all kinds of rights in personal. It is greatly to be hoped 
that such an unusual and, for the English law, misleading use 
of terms will not become at all common. 
(c) A single multital right, or claim, (right in rem) correlates 
with a duty resting on one person alone, not with many duties- 
(or one duty) resting upon all the members of a very large and 
indefinite class of persons: Though fairly implicated with what 
has been said in the "preliminary" explanation of ideas and 
terms,62 this proposition now requires more detailed considera- 
tion; for it represents a considerable departure from the explana- 
tions or analyses to be found in treatises on jurisprudence or in 
books on particular branches of the law. Let us first have 
definitely before us some typical passages: 
i832, Professor John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or the 
Philosophy of Positive Law: 
"All rights reside in persons, and are rights to acts or 
forbearances on the part of other persons.... 
"The essentials of a right in rem are these: 
"It resides in a determinate person, or in determinate 
persons, and avails against other persons universally or 
'See the quotations given ante: Mr. Justice Holmes, pp. 730-731 ; Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, p. 733; Lord Sumner, p. 732. 
See also the term "personal rights" as used by Mr. Justice Holmes, 
dissenting, in the very recent case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 
(U. S. Sup. Ct., May 21, 1917). 
' See ante, pp. 718 ff. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 17:35:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 741 
generally. Further, the duty with which it correlates, or 
to which it corresponds, is negative: that is to say, a duty 
to forbear or abstain. 
"The duty which correlates with [a right in remi 
attaches upon persons generally."63 
i87I, Mr. Justice Markby, Elements of Law: 
"The persons to whom a right in rem belongs may be 
changed to any extent within the limits allowed by the 
law, but the persons upon whom the duty corresponding 
to a right in rem is imposed cannot be changed, because 
all persons are under that duty."04 
i88o, Professor Thomas Erskine Holland, Elements of Juris- 
prudence: 
"'A right is available either against a definite person or 
persons, or against all persons indefinitely.... 
"This distinction between rights has been expressed by 
calling a right of the definite kind a right in personal, of 
the indefinite kind a right in rem."65 
I902, Mr. Solicitor-General Salmond, Jurisprudence: 
"A real right corresponds to a duty imposed on persons 
in general. . . . The indeterminate incidence of the duty 
which corresponds to a real right, renders impossible many 
modes of dealing with it which are of importance in the 
case of personal rights."06 
I9I5, Professor Harlan Fiske Stone, Law and its Adminis- 
tration: 
"One may have a right against all members of the com- 
munity indifferently. Thus one has the right not to have 
his person or his property unlawfully interfered with, and 
this right exists generally against all members of the 
community."87 
i9i6, Professor Samuel Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee 
of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable.? 
Jurisp. (5th ed., i885) Vol. I, pp. 368, 394, 371, 586. 
'Elements of Law (6th ed., 1905) pp. 91, 99. 
'%Jurisp. (ioth ed., igo6) p. 139. 
Jurisp. (4th ed., 1913) pp. 202, 203. 
e7Law and its Administration (1915) p. 53. 
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"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally 
as a right good against all the world, actual instances of 
such ownership are often much more narrowly limited. 
The owner of a chattel which has been stolen from him 
is likely to find his right against the world considerably 
qualified if the thief is in a place where the principles of 
market overt prevail."68 
In opposition to the ideas embodied in the passages just given,69 
it is submitted that instead of there being a single right with a 
single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom 
the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, 
actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty 
resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case 
put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and 
X is the owner of Whiteacre. It may be assumed further that, 
in consideration of $ioo actually paid by A to B, the latter agrees 
with A never to enter on X's land, Whiteacre; also that C and D, 
at the 'same time and for separate considerations, make respective 
similar agreements with A. In such a case A's respective rights 
against B, C, and D are clearly rights in personaam, or paucital 
rights. Surely no one would assert that A has only a single right 
against B, C, and D, with only a single or unified duty resting 
on the latter. A's right against B is entirely separate from the 
other two. B may commit a breach of his duty, without involving 
any breach of C's duty by C or any breach of D's duty by D. 
For, obviously, the content of each respective duty differs from 
each of the others. To make it otherwise C and D would have 
to be under a duty or duties (along with B) that B should not 
enter on X's land. Even if that were the case, there would be 
said to be three separate duties unless B, C, and D bound them- 
selves so as to create a so-called joint obligation. In the latter 
case alone would there be said to be a single right and a single 
(joint) duty. Going beyond this direct analysis of the situation, 
it seems clear that the three respective "right-duty" relations 
of A and B, A and C, and A and D respond to every test of 
separateness and independence. A might discharge B from his 
duty to A, thus (in equivalent terms) creating a privilege of 
entering as against A (not- as against X, of course); yet, 
(i9i6) 30 HARV. L. REV. 97, 98. 
' See also the various judicial opinions from which quotations are 
given ante pp. 729-733. 
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obviously, the respective duties of C and D would continue the 
same as before. 
Point for point, the same considerations and tests seem 
applicable to A's respective rights in rem, or multital rights, 
against B, C, D, and others indefinitely that they, respectively 
considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one 
joint duty of the same content resting on all-e. g., that B should 
not enter on Blackacre.70 Consistently with this view, A might, 
e. g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege 
of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such 
event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others 
would continue to exist, precisely as before. 
In order to see even more clearly that the supposed single right 
in rem correlating with "a duty" on "all" persons really involves 
as many separate and distinct "right-duty" relations as there 
are persons subject to a duty, it may be worth while to reverse 
the situation somewhat, and consider, in anticipation of a more 
general treatment at a later point, the subject of duties in rem, 
or multital duties. Thus, e. g., X is under duty not to strike R, 
70 Compare, however, special cases like Thorpe v. Brumfitt (i873) 
L. R. 8 Ch. App. 65o, involving a suit for an injunction against several 
defendants for disturbance of plaintiff's right of way. Lord Justice James 
said: "The plaintiff cannot complain, unless he can prove an obstruction 
which injures him. The case is not like one of trespass, which gives a 
right of action though no damage be proved. In the present case, I 
cannot come to any other conclusion than that arrived at by the Master 
of the Rolls, that the right of access to the inn-yard has been interfered 
with in a way most prejudicial to the Plaintiff. Nothing can be much 
more injurious to the owner of an inn than that the way to his yard 
should be constantly obstructed by the loading and unloading of heavy 
waggons. If a person who was going to put up his horses at the inn was 
stopped by the loading or unloading of waggons, he would probably at 
once go to another inn. Then it was said that the Plaintiff alleges an 
obstruction caused by several persons acting independently of each other, 
and does not shew what share each had in causing it. It is probably 
impossible for a person in the Plaintiff's position to shew this. Nor do 
I think it necessary that he should shew it. The amount of obstruction 
caused by any one of them might not, if it stood alone, be sufficient to give 
any ground of complaint, though the amount caused by them all may be 
a serious injury. Suppose one person leaves a wheelbarrow standing on 
a way, that may cause no appreciable inconvenience, but if a hundred do 
so, that may cause a serious inconvenience, which a person entitled to 
the use of the way has a right to prevent; and it is no defence to any 
one person among the hundred to say that what he does causes of itself 
no damage to the complainant." 
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S, T, or any other ordinary member of the community. Are we 
to say that, as regards these many persons, X has but a single 
duty,"' and that, correlatively, there is but a single right held 
by R, S, T, and all the others? Manifestly not, for each one 
of these persons has a distinct and independent right; and any 
one of such independent rights might cease to exist without in 
the least affecting the others. If, e. g., R threatens bodily harm 
to X, R's right that X shall not strike him becomes thereby 
extinguished, and a no-right in R substituted; or, correlatively, 
in such contingency, X's duty to R ceases, and X acquires a 
privilege of self-defense against R. But such change in no way 
affects the entirely distinct relations existing between X and the 
various other persons involved. As regards the separateness 
and relativity of all "right-duty" relations, the following 
judicial reasoning seems accurate and persuasive: 
i908, Mr. Justice Connor, in McGhee v. R. Co.: 
"It is elementary that plaintiff had no cause of action 
against defendants for placing the dynamite in the shanty. 
He must establish some relation between defendants and 
himself from which a duty to him is imposed upon defen- 
dants. 'The expression "duty" properly imports a deter- 
minate person to whom the obligation is owing, as well as 
the one who owes the obligation. There must be two 
determinate parties before the relationship of obligor and 
obligee of a duty can exist.' "172 
With this passage we may well compare the instructive opinion 
of an eminent English judge emphasizing the distinct and relative 
character of each "privilege-no-right" relation connected with 
a given matter, his observations being equally applicable to 
"right-duty" relations: 
I906, Lord Collins, M. R., in Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew, & 
Co., Ltd.: 
7' Some would say yes: compare Sir Frederick Pollock, Jurisprudence 
(2d ed., i9o4) 64: "Doubtless there are duties without any determinate 
rights corresponding to them: indeed, this is the case, in any view, with 
the negative duties which we owe to the community at large. For my 
duty not to damage other people's goods, for example, is one duty, not 
millions of separate duties owed to every one who has anything to be 
damaged, or in respect of every separate chattel of any value." 
n (igo8) i47 N. C. i42, i46. 
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"The right" [privilege] "of fair comment, though 
shared by the public, is the right" [privilege] "of every 
individual who asserts it, and is, qua him, an individual 
right whatever name it be called by, and comment by him 
which is coloured by malice cannot from his standpoint 
be deemed fair. He, and he only, is the person in whose 
motives the plaintiff in the libel action is concerned, and 
if he, the person sued, is proved to have allowed his view 
to be distorted by malice, it is quite immaterial that some- 
body else might without malice have written an equally 
damnatory criticism. The defendant, and not that other 
person, is the party sued."73 
If, then, the foregoing line of reasoning be sound, the following 
points would seem to be reasonably clear: A right in rem, or 
multital right, correctly understood, is simply one of a large 
number of fundamentally similar rights residing in one person; 
and any one of such rights has as its correlative one, and only 
one, of a large number of general, or common, duties,-that is, 
fundamentaly similar duties residing respectively in many dif- 
ferent persons. Similarly, a duty in rem, or multital duty, is one 
of a large number of fundamentally similar duties residing in one 
person; and any one of such duties has as its correlative one 
of a large number of general, or common, rights, or claims,-that 
is, fundamentally similar rights, or claims, residing respectively 
in many different persons. It is therefore to be hoped that, 
instead of continuing to be used to indicate the entire multi- 
plicity of separate and independent rights, or claims, that a person 
may have against many others, the term right in rem may 
gradually come to be used to represent one, and only one, of this 
multiplicity of distinct rights. Whatever be the fate of the con- 
cept and term, right in rem, in this regard, it is surely of the 
utmost importance that the various possible analyses and mean- 
ings involved be carefully pondered and understood; and, in the 
meanwhile, the term "multital"-free as it is from any previous 
hazy connotations-will without question serve definitely to indi- 
cate one, and one only, of such a multiplicity of rights as is now 
under consideration. 
(d) A multital right, or claim, (right in rem) should not be 
confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations 
that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect 
to the same subject-matter: As already incidentally noticed, it is 
I [i906] 2 K. B. 627, 638. 
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feared that the exact nature of multital rights has been greatly 
obscured not only by the habitual tendency to treat a multiplicity 
of fundamentally similar rights, or claims, as if they were only 
one, but also by the equally strong tendency to include under the 
hazy blanket term, right in rem, especially in the case of tangible 
objects, the multiplicity of privileges and other jural relations 
that the holder of the multital right or rights may have. 
Suppose, for example, that A is fee-simple owner of Blackacre. 
His "legal interest" or "property" relating to the tangible 
object that we call land consists of a complex aggregate of rights 
(or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities.74 First: A has 
multital legal rights, or claims, that others, respectively, shall not 
enter on the land, that they shall not cause physical harm to the 
land, etc., such others being under respective correlative legal 
duties. Second: A has an indefinite number of legal privileges 
of entering on the land, using the land, harming the land, etc., 
that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and 
economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land 
what he pleases; and correlative to all such legal privileges are 
the respective legal no-rights of other persons. Third: A has 
the legal power to alienate his legal interest to another, i. e., to 
extinguish his complex aggregate of jural relations and create a 
new and similar aggregate in the other person; also the legal 
power to create a life estate in another and concurrently to 
create a reversion in himself; also the legal power to create a 
privilege of entrance in any other person by giving "leave and 
license"; and so on indefinitely. Correlative to all such legal 
powers are the legal liabilities in other persons,-this meaning 
that the latter are subject, nolens volens, to the changes of jural 
relations involved in the exercise of A's powers. Fourth: A has 
an indefinite number of legal immunities, using the term immunity 
in the very specific sense of non-liability or non-subjection to 
a power on the part of another person. Thus he has the im- 
munity that no ordinary person can alienate A's legal interest or 
aggregate of jural relations to another person; the immunity 
"See (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 2I, 24, 59. Compare also Mr. 
Justice Foster, in Pullitzer v. Livingston (I896) 89 Me. 359: "With all 
the rights, privileges, and powers incident to ownership," etc. 
See also Professor Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some 
of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 172. 
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that no ordinary person can extinguish A's own privileges of 
using the land; the immunity that no ordinary person can 
extinguish A's right that another person X shall not enter on 
the land or, in other words, create in X a privilege of entering 
on the land. Correlative to'all these immunities are the respective 
legal disabilities of other persons in general. 
In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, mul- 
tital, or in rem, "right-duty" relations, multital, or in rem, 
"privilege-no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power- 
liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity-dis- 
ability" relations. It is important, in order to have an adequate 
analytical view of property, to see all these various elements in 
the aggregate. It is equally important, for many reasons, that 
the different classes of jural relations should not be loosely con- 
fused with one another.' A's privileges, e. g., are strikingly 
independent of his rights or claims against any given person, 
and either might exist without the other. Thus A might, for 
$ioo paid to him by B, agree in writing to keep off Blackacre. 
A would still have his rights or claims against B, that the latter 
should keep off, etc.; yet, as against B, A's own privileges of 
entering on Blackacre would be gone. On the other hand, with 
regard to X's land, Whiteacre, A has, as against B, the privilege 
of entering thereon; but, not having possession, he has no right, 
or claim, that B shall not enter on Whiteacre. 
Not only as a matter of accurate analysis and exposition, but 
also as a matter of great practical consequence and economic 
significance, the property owner's rights, or claims, should be 
sharply differentiated from his privileges. It is sometimes 
thought that A's rights, or claims, are created by the law for 
the sole purpose of guarding or protecting A's own physical 
user or enjoyment of the land, as if such physical user or enjoy- 
ment of the land were the only economic factor of importance. 
A moment's reflection, however, shows that this is a very inade- 
quate view. Even though the land be entirely vacant and A have 
no intention whatever of personally using the land, his rights 
or claims that others shall not use it even temporarily in such 
ways as would not alter its physical character are, generally, of 
great economic significance as tending to make others compensate 
A in exchange for the extinguishment of his rights, or claims, 
or in other words, the creation of privileges of user and enjoy- 
ment. This has been emphasized by an eminent English judge: 
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i874, Lord Selborne, Chancellor, in Goodson v. Richardson:75 
"It is said that the objection of the plaintiff to the 
laying of these pipes in his land is an unneighborly thing, 
and that his right is one of little or no value, and one 
which Parliament if it were to deal with the question, 
might possibly disregard. What Parliament might do, if 
it were to deal with the question, is, I apprehend, not a 
matter for our consideration now, as Parliament has not 
dealt with the question. Parliament is, no doubt, at liberty 
to take a higher view upon a balance struck between 
private rights and public interests than this Court can take. 
But with respect to the suggested absence of value of 
the land in its present situation, it is enough to say that 
the very fact that no interference of this kind can law- 
fully take place without his consent, and without a bargain 
with him, gives his interest in this land, even in a pecuniary 
point of view, precisely the value which that power of 
veto upon its use creates, when such use is to any other 
person desirable and an object sought to be obtained."76 
Even so able and cautious a thinker as Austin seems to have 
confused legal privileges with legal rights (in the sense of 
claims), and also, at times, to have confused mere physical 
power and liberty both with legal privileges and with legal rights. 
Probably because of the very failure to make these necessary 
and important discriminations, he appears to have overlooked, 
or at least seriously underrated, the practical and economic sig- 
nificance of the landowner's "right-duty" relations considered 
wholly apart from their being guardians of the "privilege- 
no-right" relations, or protectors of the physical liberty and 
power involved in the exercise of such legal privileges: 
I832, Professor John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or 
the Philosophy of Positive Law: 
"Now the -ends or purposes of different rights are ex- 
tremely various. The end of the rights in rem which 
are conferred over things, is this: that the entitled party 
may deal with, or dispose of, the thing in question in 
such or such a manner and to such or such an extent. 
In order to that end, other persons generally are laid 
under duties to forbear or abstain from acts which would 
defeat or thwart it. . .. 
7 (i874) L. R. 9 Ch. App. 221, 223. 
s Compare Henry Pitney, V. C., in Hennessy v. Carmony (i892) 50 
N. J. Eq. 6i6. 
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"As I stated in my last lecture, I mean by property 
or dominion (taken with the sense wherein I use the 
term, for the present) any such right in rem (of limited 
or unlimited duration) as gives to the party in whom it 
resides an indefinite power or liberty of using or dealing 
with the subject: A power or liberty of using or dealing 
with the subject which is not capable of exact circum- 
scription or definition; which is merely limited, generally 
and indefinitely, by the sum of the duties (relative and 
absolute) incumbent on the owner or proprietor.... 
"The power of user and the power of exclusion are 
equally rights to forbearances on the part of other persons 
generally. By virtue of the right or power of indefinitely 
using the subject, other persons generally are bound to 
forbear from disturbing the owner in acts of user. By 
virtue of the right or power of excluding other persons 
generally, other persons generally are bound to forbear 
from using or meddling with the subject. The rights of 
user and exclusion are so blended, that an offence against 
the one is commonly an offence against the other. I can 
hardly prevent you from ploughing your field, or from 
raising a building upon it, without committing, at the same 
time, a trespass. And an attempt on my part to use the 
subject (as an attempt, for example, to fish in your pond) 
is an interference with your right of user as well as with 
your right of exclusion. But an offence against one of 
these rights is not of necessity an offence against the 
other. If, for example, I walk across your field, in order 
to shorten my way to a given point, I may not in the least 
injure you in respect of your right of user, although I 
violate your right of exclusion. Violations of the right 
of exclusion (when perfectly harmless in themselves) are 
treated as injuries or offences by reason of their probable 
effect on the rights of user and exclusion. A harmless 
violation of the right of exclusion, if it passed with per- 
fect impunity, might lead, by force of the example, to such 
numerous violations of the right as would render both 
rights nearly nugatory."77 
In these various passages, and especially in the last one, 
Austin uses the term "right" indiscriminately and confusedly to 
indicate both those jural relations that are legal rights, or claims, 
and those that are legal privileges-a lapse all the more surprising 
in view of the fact that the learned and painstaking author had 
previously been careful to emphasize the proposition that "the 
term 'right' and the term 'relative duty' signify the same 
' Jurisp. (5th ed., i885) Vol. I, p. 397, Vol. II, pp. 799, 802, 8M8. 
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notion considered from different aspects."78 Such a delimita- 
tion of "right" clearly excludes "legal privilege"; for the cor- 
relative of the latter, or "the same notion" from a "different 
aspect," is, of course, "no-right" or "no-claim." 
More or less similar blending of legal concepts and terms in 
connection with the subject of rights in rem seems to find place 
not only in well-known works on jurisprudence but also in various 
treatises or monographs on particular branches of the law.79 
Indeed it is not unlikely that the later writers have in this respect 
but followed the lead of Austin, as they have in so many other 
matters of legal analysis. The following passages will serve to 
show how general is the usage referred to, and, it is believed, 
will also indicate how such a usage tends to hinder and obscure 
correct analysis and clear understanding of legal problems: 
i87i, Mr. Justice Markby, Elements of Law: 
"Thus in the case of a contract between A and B. the 
right of A to demand performance of the contract exists 
against B only; whereas in the case of ownership, the 
right to hold and enjoy the property exists against persons 
generally. This distinction between rights is marked by 
the use of terms derived from the Latin: the former 
are called rights in personal; the latter are called rights 
in rem."80 
i88o, Professor Thomas Erskine Holland, Elements of Juris- 
prudence: 
"A right is available either against a definite person 
or persons, or against all persons indefinitely. A servant, 
for instance, has a right to his wages for the work he has 
J8lurisp. (5th ed., i885) Vol. I, p. 395. 
79 It is, of course, possible for a given writer to "impose" on a term 
what meaning he will, within the principle of the following: 
"'When I use a word,'-Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful 
tone,-'it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.' 
"'The question is,' said Alice,-'whether you can make words mean so 
many different things?' 
"'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty,-'which is to be the master? 
That's all."' Through the Looking Glass, Chap. VI. 
If, however, this more or less arbitrary plan be pursued, it is at least 
desirable that it be done premeditatedly, and that adequate notice be 
given. It is, moreover, believed that, in the cases put in the text, the 
difficulties involved are concerned primarily with concepts rather than 
terms. 
Elements of Law (6th ed., I905) p. 98. 
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done, available against a definite individual, his master; 
while the owner of a garden has a right to its exclusive 
enjoyment available against no one individual more than 
another, but against everybody."8' 
1902, Mr. Solicitor-General Salmond, Jurisprudence: 
"My right to the peaceable occupation of my farm is 
a real right, for all the world is under a duty towards me 
not to interfere with it. . . . I have a real right to the 
use and occupation of my own house; I have a personal 
right to receive accommodation at an inn. "82 
i874, Mr. Stephen Martin Leake, Law of Property in Land: 
"Rights to things, jura in rem, have for their subject 
some material thing, as land or goods, which the owner 
may use or dispose of in any manner he pleases within 
the limits prescribed by the terms of his right. A right 
of this kind imports in all persons generally the cor- 
relative negative duty of abstaining from any interference 
with the exercise of it by the owner; and by enforcing 
this duty the law protects and establishes the right. But 
a right of this kind does not import any positive duty 
in any determinate person, or require any act or inter- 
vention of such person for its exercise and enjoyment."83 
I887, Professor James Barr Ames, Purchase for Value without 
Notice: 
"The most striking difference between property in a 
thing and property in an obligation is in the mode of 
enjoyment. The owner of a house or a horse enjoys the 
fruits of ownership without the aid of any other person. 
The only way in which the owner of an obligation can 
realize his ownership is by compelling its performance by 
the obligor. Hence, in the one case, the owner is said 
to have a right in rem, and, in the 'other, a right in 
personamn."84 
I9I5, Professor Harlan Fiske Stone, Law and its Adminis- 
tration: 
"It will be noted that the essential difference between a 
right in rem and a right in personal is that a right in rem 
may be enjoyed by the possessor of it without the inter- 
81 Elements of Jurisprudence (ioth ed., i906) p. 139. 
8 Jurisp. (4th ed., I913) pp. 202, 203. 
'Law of Property in Land (ist ed., i874) p. 2. 
`4(i$87) i HARv. L. REV. I, 9. 
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vention or aid of any other person, whereas the possessor 
of a right in personam can enjoy his possession or owner- 
ship of it only by compelling the obligor to perform the 
obligation which gives use to the right.... 
"Rights in rem include generally all of those rights com- 
monly spoken of as property rights; that is to say, rights 
to possess, use, and enjoy things, which rights are good 
and enforceable against all the world."85 
i9i6, Professor Samuel Williston, Is the Right of an Assignee 
of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable? 
"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as 
a right good against all the world, actual instances of 
such ownership are often much more narrowly limited."8" 
(e) A multital primary right, or claim, (right in rem) should, 
regarding its character as such, be carefully differentiated from 
the paucital secondary right, or claim, (right in personam) 
arising from a violation of the former: Using again the hypo- 
thetical case involving A as owner of Blackacre, it is clear that 
if B commits a destructive trespass on A's land, there arises at 
that moment a new right, or claim, in favor of A,-i. e., a 
so-called secondary -right that B shall pay him a sum of money 
as damages; and of course B comes simultaneously under a 
correlative duty. Similarly if C commits a battery on A, or if 
D alienates the affections of A's wife; and so on indefinitely. 
In each of these cases the secondary right-e. g., that against 
B-is a paucital right, or claim, i. e., a right in personal. The 
entire "right-duty" relation would be one of the class of 
relations in personam designated in Roman law by the term 
obliga-tio. More specifically, the relation would be known as an 
obligation ex delicto. This is brought out by the language of 
an eminent judge: 
i904, Mr Justice Holmes, in Slater v. Mexican National R. R. 
Co.: 
"We assume for the moment that it was sufficiently 
alleged and proved that the killing of Slater was a negli- 
gent crime within the definition of Article Ii of the Penal 
Code, and, therefore, if the above sections were the only 
law bearing on the matter, that they created a civil lia- 
' Law and its Administration (i9i5) PP. 5I, 54, 57. 
' (i9i6) 30 HARV. L. REV. 97, 98. 
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bility to make reparation to any one whose rights were 
infringed. 
"The theory of the foreign suit is that . . . the act 
complained of . . . gave rise to an obligation, an 
obligation . . "87 
This analysis seems applicable even in the case of a tort con- 
sisting of wrongfully dispossessing an owner of a tangible 
movable object. Thus, if Y wrongfully takes possession and 
control of X's horse, there arises a duty in Y to return the 
animal to X; and, of course, X gets a correlative right. The 
latter is a paucital right, or right in personal; for there are 
no fundamentally similar rights against persons in general. This 
is true even though, of course, X's rights against others that 
they shall not convert or harm the horse while in Y's possession 
are rights in rem. The following passage is apposite: 
i900, Mr. Chief Justice Holmes, in Tyler v. Court of Regis- 
tration: 
"But it is said that this is not a proceeding in rem. It 
is certain that no phrase has been more misused. In the 
past it has had little more significance than that the right 
alleged to have been violated was a right in rem. Austin 
thinks it necessary to quote Leibnitz for the sufficiently 
obvious remark that every right to restitution is a right in 
personam. "88 
That this distinction is not always carefully observed may be 
seen from a consideration of the quotations next to be presented. 
(f) A multital primary right, or claim, (right in rem) should 
not, regarding its character as such, be confused with, or thought 
dependent on, the character of the proceedings by which it (and 
the secondary right arising from its violation) may be vindicated: 
Owing to limitations of space this matter cannot be given here all 
the attention that it deserves; and the more complete discussion 
must be reserved for another place. Some of the more important 
points should, however, be noticed in the present context. 
At least two tendencies are occasionally to be. observed by way 
of confusing the nature of primary rights (as in personam or 
in rem) with the character of the proceedings by which they may 
be vindicated. Both of these tendencies are believed to be 
' 
(1904) 194 U. S. I20, I25. 
8 
(1900) I75 Mass. 7I, 76. 
55 
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founded on seriously erroneous notions that ought, if possible, to 
be dissipated. Each of them will, therefore, be briefly discussed. 
First: It is sometimes supposed that to have a right in rem 
concerning a tangible object of which the owner has been wrong- 
fully dispossessed means that he may recover possession of the 
object itself, by self-help or action, from the first wrongdoer or 
any subsequent party holding possession as vendee or bailee of 
the first wrongdoer, or as wrongful taker from the latter. Thus: 
i89o, Professor James Barr Ames, Disseisin of Chattels: 
"Trespass, however, was a purely personal action; it 
sounded only in damages. The wrongful taking of chat- 
tels was, therefore, a more effectual disseisin than the 
ouster from land. The dispossessed owner of land, as we 
have seen, could always recover possession by an action. 
Though deprived of the res, he still had a right in rem. 
The disseisor acquired only a defeasible estate. One 
whose chattel had been taken from him, on the other 
hand, having no means of recovering it by action, not 
only lost the res, but had no right in rem. The disseisor 
gained by his tort both the possession and the right of 
possession; in a word, the absolute property in the chattel 
taken.. 
"Today, as everyone knows, neither a trespasser, nor 
one taking or buying from him, nor the vendee of a bailee, 
either with or without delivery by the latter, acquires the 
absolute property in the chattel taken or bailed. The dis- 
seisee of goods, as well as the disseisee of land, has a 
right in rem. The process by which the right in personam 
has been transformed into a real right may be traced in 
the expansion of the writs of replevin and detinue, and 
is sufficiently curious td warrant a slight digression. ... 
"The disseisee's right in rem, however, was still a quali- 
fied right; for replevin was never allowed in England 
against a vendee or bailee of a trespasser, nor against a 
second trespasser. It was only by the later extension of 
the action of detinue that a disseisee finally acquired a 
perfect right in rem. Detinue, although its object was 
the recovery of a specific chattel, was originally an action 
ex contract. It was allowed only against a bailee or 
against a vendor, who after the sale and before delivery 
was in much the same position as a bailee. ... 
"So long as the adverse possession continues, the dis- 
possessed owner of the chattel has, manifestly, no power 
of present enjoyment. Has he lost also the power of 
alienation? His right in rem, if analyzed, means a right 
to recover possession by reception or action."89 
I (i890) 3 HARV. L. REV. 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 337. 
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As indicated by the passages quoted, Professor Ames seems 
to have thought that for the owner, after dispossession, to have 
rights in remt would require the remedy of specific recovery of 
the tangible object. This, however, seems to involve a blending 
or confusing of substantive relations and adjective relations. 
If A, the owner of a tangible movable object, is dispossessed by B, 
A, under modern authorities, has rights against all persons that 
the object should not be harmed or "converted"; and these rights 
could be vindicated by an action on the case or by an action of 
trover, as the facts might demand. It is clear, moreover, that 
such rights would exist, as multital rights, or rights in rem, 
even though no possessory remedy were open to A. 
If we may judge by the passages quoted above, it seems 
not unlikely that Professor Ames, because of assuming that 
a right in rem concerning physical objects involves necessarily, 
in case of dispossession, the remedy of recovery of posses- 
sion, would apparently have asserted that in the early days 
even a chattel owner in actual possession did not have "a right 
in rem" ;90 and it is clear, in any event, that the possibility of 
regaining possession by action or self-help is frequently assumed 
to be of the essence of "a right in rem." 
This, however, seems a very inadequate and inexact view. 
Even in the days when wrongful dispossession operated virtually 
to divest the legal interest of the chattel owner, it was still true 
that prior to any such dispossessing of the physical object and 
concomitant divesting of the legal interest he had rights in rem 
against persons in general that they should not harm the object 
or take the object from the owner; and these respective multital 
rights, or rights in rem, could, as Professor Ames himself points 
out, be vindicated by trespass or other action brought to secure 
damages. 9?0 In other words, the chattel owner's rights, so long 
as he had them, were rights in rem, even though in the early 
period now referred to (middle of the thirteenth century) he 
Compare Ames, Disseisin of Chattels (i8go) 3 HARv. L. REV. 3I4, 
fassim; consider especially the statement: "A true property may, there- 
fore, be shortly defined as possession coupled with the unlimited right of 
possession." This definition would seem to involve a serious confusion 
of physical relations with legal relations. 
Compare also Ames, Lectures on Legal History (19I3) p. 76, passage 
quoted post, pp. 758-759. 
90a See Ames, Lectures on Legal History (19I3) pp. 6o, n. I, I78 ff. 
For judicial, consideration of the early history of the action of trespass, 
see Admiralty Commissioners v. S. S. Amerika [I9I7] A. C. 38. 
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was subject to the liabilities of their being virtually divested by a 
wrongful taking,-there being, correlatively, a power in the 
wrongdoer thus to divest the interest of the chattel owner. 
Fundamentally similar legal powers and correlative liabilities 
involving the divesting of "legal"9' and "equitable" rights 
in rem (and other jural relations belonging to the particular 
aggregates involved) have existed from the earliest times. Such 
powers are created by the law on various grounds of policy and 
convenience,-the teleology underlying each particular instance 
not being difficult to discover. In this place a bare enumeration 
of some of such powers must suffice: i. The power of sale in 
market overt to a bona fide purchaser; 2. The power of even a 
thief having possession of money but not, of course, the "owner- 
ship" thereof, to create a good title in a bona fide "purchaser,"92- 
the whole country being in this case, so to say, "market overt" 
because of the necessity of free circulation of money, and it being 
too inconvenient for the transferrer to produce or the transferee 
to examine an "abstract of title"; 3. The power or powers 
of a grantor and second grantee of realty, under the record- 
ing acts, to extinguish the interest of the first grantee by 
a conveyance to the second grantee as an innocent purchaser 
and the prior recording of the latter's deed; 93 4. The statutory 
power of a factor, in certain cases, to create a good title in an 
innocent purchaser; 5. The power of a duly appointed agent, 
in certain cases, to sell chattels to an innocent purchaser, even 
after his factual authorization to sell has been revoked by the 
"All legal rights, if genuine and valid, are really "concurrently legal 
and equitable," if considered with respect to the sanctions involved. See 
The Relations between Equity ahd Law (19I3) Ii MIcH. L. REV. 537; also 
Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action- 
A Reply to Professor Williston (I9I7) 30 HARv. L. REV. 449, 455. 
'Compare Viscount Haldane, L. C., in Sinclair v. Brougham [I9I4] 
A. C. 398, 4i8, 4I9, quoted ante, p. 732. 
9 Compare Lord Justice Cozens-Hardy in Capital & Counties Bank, 
Ltd. v. Rhodes [I903] i Ch. 63i, 655-656: 
"The transfer by registered disposition takes effect by virtue of 
an overriding power, and not by virtue of any estate in the regis- 
tered proprietor. . . . Notwithstanding that the land has become 
registered land, it may still be dealt with by deeds having the same 
operation- and effect as they would have if the land were unregis- 
tered, subject only to the risk of the title being defeated . .. 
by the exercise of the statutory powers of disposition given to the 
registered proprietor, against which the mortgagee must protect 
himself by notice on the register." 
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principal; 6. The power of a trustee to convey an unencumbered 
illegal title" to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice,- 
the equitable rights, privileges, etc., of the cestui que trust being 
thereby extinguished. 
The foregoing and others that might be mentioned are cases 
depending on the public policy of securing freedom of alienation 
and circulation of property in the business world. There may 
now be mentioned certain other cases dependent on somewhat 
different teleological considerations: i. The power of an ordinary 
agent (while his factual authorization continues) to divest the 
rights in rem, etc., of his principal and create new and corre- 
sponding rights, etc., in the agent's transferee; 2. The power of a 
donee of a power of appointment to extinguish the rights in rem, 
etc., of the owner of a vested interest and to create new and 
corresponding rights, etc., in the transferee; 3. The power of 
the appropriate officer or officers to alienate property effectually in 
eminent domain proceedings; 4. The power of a sheriff duly 
empowered by writ of execution to divest the rights in rem, etc., 
of the present owner of property and to vest new and cor- 
responding rights, etc., in another; 5. The power of a court, in 
a statutory proceeding to quiet title, to extinguish the rights 
in rem, etc., of the present owner and to give new and cor- 
responding rights, etc., to the plaintiff; 6. Various other powers 
of courts involving the "shifting" of title from one person to 
another. 
In all these cases it is clear that the present owner has rights 
in rem, etc., in spite of his liabilities that they may be divested 
through the exercise of the various powers indicated. 
Second: We must now consider a second form of the same 
general tendency to assume some rigid interdependence between 
the nature of a right in rem as such and the character of the 
proceeding available for its vindication. This erroneous assump- 
tion has most often been made in discussions of the question 
whether there are any instances of equitable rights in rem 
(multital rights), or, indeed, whether there could, in the very 
nature of things, be any instances of equitable rights in rem. 
Thus: 
i877, Professor C. C. Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading: 
"The reason why all equitable rights to property are 
lost the moment the legal ownership is transferred for 
value to a person who has no notice that it is subject to 
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any equitable rights, will be found in the fundamental 
nature of equitable jurisdiction, as explained in previous 
paragraphs. It is only by a figure of speech that a person 
who has not the legal title to property can be said to be 
the equitable owner of it. What is called equitable owner- 
ship or equitable title or an equitable estate is in truth 
only a personal claim against the real owner; for equity 
has no jurisdiction in rem, and cannot, therefore, confer a 
true ownership, except by its power over the person with 
whom the ownership resides, i. e., by compelling him to 
convey."94 
i900, Professor C. C. Langdell, Classification of Rights and 
Wrongs: 
"Can equity then create such rights as it finds to be 
necessary for the purposes of justice? As equity wields 
only physical power, it seems to be impossible that it should 
actually create anything. It seems, moreover, to be im- 
possible that there should be any other actual rights than 
such as are created by the State, i. e., legal rights. So, 
too, if equity could create actual rights, the existence of 
rights so created would have to be recognized by every 
court of justice within the State; and yet no other court 
than a court of equity will admit the existence of any right 
created by equity. It seems, therefore, that equitable 
rights exist only in contemplation of equity, i. e., that they 
are a fiction invented by equity for the promotion of jus- 
tice. Still, as in contemplation of equity such rights do 
exist, equity must reason upon them and deal with them 
as if they had an actual existence."95 
Circa i886, Professor James Barr Ames, Lectures on Legal 
History: 
"A trust, as every one knows, has been enforceable 
for centuries against any holder of the title except a 
purchaser for value without notice. But this exception 
shows that the cestui que trust, unlike the bailor, has not 
acquired a right in rem.95a This distinction is, of course, 
due to the fundamental difference between common-law 
"Summary of Equity Pleading (2d ed., i883) sec. i84. 
" (I900) 13 HARv. L. REV. 673, 677. For analysis and criticism of the 
views of Professors Langdell, Ames, and Maitland as regards the rela- 
tions of substantive equitable doctrines to substantive legal doctrines, see 
the writer's article, The Relations between Equity and Law (I9I3) II 
MICH. L. REv. 537. 
See also Supplemental Note on The Conflict of Equity and Law, post, 
PP. 767 ff. 
`4aFor criticism of this assumption, see ante, p. 7I9, n. 22. 
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and equity procedure. The common law acts in rem. The 
judgment in detinue is, accordingly, that the plaintiff 
recover the chattel, or its value.Y5b Conceivably the com- 
mon-law judges might have refused to allow the bailor to 
recover in detinue against a bona fide purchaser, as they 
did refuse it against a purchaser in market overt. But 
this would have involved a weighing of ethical considera- 
tions altogether foreign to the medieval mode of thought. 
Practically there was no middle ground between restricting 
the bailor to an action against his bailee, and giving him 
a right against any possessor. Equity, on the other hand, 
acts only in personal, never decreeing that a plaintiff 
recover a res, but that the defendant surrender what in 
justice he cannot keep."96 
1904, Professor Frederic William Maitland, Trust and Cor- 
poration: 
"I think it is better and safer to say with a great 
American teacher that 'Equity could not create rights in 
rem if it would, and would not if it could.' See Langdell, 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Vol. I, P. 6o. Y9 
It is difficult to find solid foundation for such assumptions as 
the foregoing, or to understand how the notions connected there- 
with could have received such a large following. Are we forced 
to recognize that mere words-especially if they are Latin 
'b But see Holmes, J., in Tyler v. Court of Registration (i900) I75 
Mass. 7I, 76, quoted post, p. 760, n. 99. 
'Lectures on Legal History (1913) p. 76. Compare Professor Harlan F. 
Stone, Law and its Administration (19I5) pp. 93, 95: "Since a judgment at 
law affects only the property of the parties to the litigation, it is some- 
times spoken of as a judgment in rem. The weakness, as well as the 
strength of such a system of procedure is apparent. To avail one's self 
of a legal remedy, one must wait until his rights have been interfered 
with and he has suffered some legal damage. 
"The distinguishing feature of equity is that the chancellor, or equity 
judge, who, because of his official position, originally had delegated to 
him the royal prerogative of command, has power to command things 
to be done or not to be done. That is, the equity courts act in p~rsonam, 
as it is said, or against the person, as distinguished from the law courts 
whose jurisdiction is in rem or over the property of the litigants. Thus, 
the chancellor could enjoin the defendant from committing a threatened 
injury to the plaintiff's property, or make a decree directing the defendant 
to convey property to the plaintiff in accordance with his contract. If 
the defendant failed to obey, he could be punished for contempt by 
imprisonment until he became obedient to the court." 
Collected Papers (i9i I) Vol. III, p. 350, n. I. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 17:35:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
760 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
words-have such a surprisingly potent tendency to control 
thought? 
Suppose, once again, that A is owner of Blackacre, and that 
B drives his automobile over A's lawn and shrubbery. A's 
primary right in rem is thereby violated, and a secondary right 
in personam arises in favor of A and against B,-an "obligatio," 
to use the term of Mr. Justice Holmes."8 A may sue B at law 
for damages and get, as a result of the "primary stage" of the 
proceeding, an ordinary legal judgment in personal for (say) 
$500. Such judgment would "merge" or extinguish A's secon- 
dary right in personal together with B's secondary duty, and 
would create a (new) judgment obligation-right in personal 
and correlative duty-for the payment of $500. Such judgment 
would be binding even though the judgment debtor, B, had no 
assets whatever.99 Thus, if B's judgment duty is not performed 
or discharged, a new action can, in most jurisdictions, be based 
thereon; though in some of the latter costs are denied to the 
plaintiff if the new action be brought without special reasons.100 
But of course A is not likely to wish merely an indefinite series 
of judgment obligations. If, therefore, B has property either at 
the time judgment is rendered or at some later time, a "secondary 
stage"'0' of the proceedings, beginning with a writ of execution, 
may be had. That is, the sheriff, under such a writ, has the 
power and the duty of selling sufficient property of B and apply- 
ing the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment. If the 
total proceedings culminate in this way, and only if they do so 
culminate, can we say that there has been a proceeding in rem,'02 
See ante, p. 753. 
See Mr. Justice Holmes, in Tyler v. Court of Registration (i900) I75 
Mass. 7I, 76: 
"If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against 
some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory 
at least, binds his body . . . . the action is in personal, although 
it may concern the right to a possession of a tangible thing." 
See also a later passage in the learned judge's opinion (p. 77), referring 
to a judgment in personam as one establishing "an infinite personal 
liability." 
See Freeman, Judgments (4th ed., i898) sec. 432, ff. 
As regards "the primary stage" and "the secondary stage" of an 
action at law or suit in equity, compare Lord Hardwicke, in Penn. v. 
Lord Baltimore (0750) i Ves. 444, 454, quoted ante, p. 7I4, n. II. 
102 Even though such execution sale take place as a result of, and subse- 
quently to, a judgment for money, neither the action brought to secure such 
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or, more specifically, quasi in rem.'03 That is to say, according 
a judgment nor the judgment itself, is said to be in rem. (Cf., however, 
Professor Ames, ante, p. 758, and Professor Stone, ante, p. 759, n. 96.) On 
the contrary, both the action and the judgment are said to be in personam. 
See Mr. Justice Holmes, in Tyler v. Court of Registration (i900) I75 
Mass. 7I, 76, quoted ante, p. 760, n. 99. 
See also Mr. Justice Cutting, in Redington v. Frye (i857) 43 Me. 
578, 586: 
"And the embarrassment has arisen in a great measure by an 
erroneous idea that the remedy of the contractor and his sub-con- 
tractor is the same; whereas the former has his security on the 
goods and estate of his debtor, that is, in personal, as well as on 
the specific property benefited by his labor, which may be in rein, 
and after judgment it is optional with the creditor on which species 
of property he will levy his execution. . . . But a sub-contractor 
has no claim against the owner of the property-his claim is only 
against the property (in rem), and the person and property of his 
employer (in personal). 
It is believed, however, that it tends greatly to clarify matters to 
distinguish sharply, as already indicated, the two stages of the judicial 
proceedings; for the two taken together operate, as regards such property 
as is sold on execution, just as if such property had been attached ab initio 
and subsequently sold, with no intermediate judgment in personal at all. 
Such an attachment proceeding would, of course, be called a proceeding 
in rem, or, more specifically, quasi in rem. 
103 Compare Mr. Justice Franklin, in Hook v. Hoffman (i9i5) i6 Ariz. 
540, 557: 
"While, properly speaking, actions or proceedings in rem are 
against the thing itself, and for the purpose of disposing thereof 
without reference to the title of particular claimants, the term has 
in a larger and broader sense been applied to certain actions and 
proceedings between parties, where the object is to reach and dis- 
pose of property owned by them or in which they have an interest; 
but, as these are not strictly in rem, they have frequently and more 
properly been termed quasi in rem, or in the nature of actions or 
proceedings in rem." 
It is, of course, inaccurate to describe the proceeding strictly in rem 
as one which is "against the thing itself." See Mr. Justice Holmes, in 
Tyler v. Court of Registration (I9oo) I75 Mass. 7I, 77: 
"Personification and naming the res as defendant are mere sym- 
bols, not the essential matter. They are fictions, conveniently 
expressing the nature of the process and the result, nothing more." 
It is submitted, moreover, that the distinction between a proceeding 
strictly in rem and one quasi in rem is not correctly or adequately described 
by saying that the former is against all the world and the latter against 
only a particular person. When, e. g., a vessel is sold, in an admiralty 
proceeding strictly in rem, the effect is to extinguish the ownership (i. e., 
aggregate of rights, etc.) of the owner and to vest a new and correspond- 
ing ownership in the purchaser. So also, when a horse supposedly belong- 
ing to B, a judgment debtor, is sold by the sheriff under a writ of 
execution, a precisely similar result occurs, provided that B, the particular 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 17:35:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
762 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
to the meanings of the phrases in personal and in rem in this 
particular context, the proceedings from the beginning of the 
action down to and including the execution sale have a two-fold 
aspect and effect: (i) the primary stage of the entire proceed- 
ings, i. e., down to judgment, is, considered by itself, a proceeding 
in personam; (2) the primary stage and the secondary stage 
(from and after judgment) are, considered together, a proceed- 
ing quasi in rem with reference to the particular property sold 
in the execution sale. 
Instead of suing B for damages and receiving a judgment in 
personal, as above described, A might in some jurisdictions, in 
case B be absent from the jurisdiction, attach a definite piece of 
B's property; and ultimately this might be sold to satisfy A's 
claim for damages. In this case the entire 'proceeding, since its 
only'effect is to extinguish B's ownership of the very property 
attached (if any he had) and create new and corresponding 
ownership in the execution purchaser, is a proceeding quasi in 
rem. 
It will thus be seen that, even in the law courts the vindication 
of primary rights in rem may, according to the circumstances, 
be by procedings in personain, or by proceedings quasi in rem, 
or by both forms of proceeding (primary and secondary stages 
of the ordinary action at law).1O4 It is equally obvious that a 
primary right in personam, e. g., A's right that B pay him $io,ooo, 
may frequently be vindicated only by an attachment proceeding,- 
1. e., one quasi in rem. 
judgment debtor named, actually does own the horse. The proceeding 
strictly in rem is sure to "hit the fight target"; whereas the proceeding 
quasi in rem is not certain to do so. 
The former, indeed, can be correctly and adequately understood only if 
it be realized that it is essentially an anonymous proceeding, being aimed 
to reach the interest of the true owner (or owners) of the property who- 
ever he may be. The proceeding quasi in rem is, on the other hand, aimed 
to reach only the interest of a named party. The effect, therefore, so 
far as transfer of ownership is concerned, is necessarily conditional upon 
some legal interest being actually vested in the particular party named. 
If effective, however, the ordinary proceeding quasi in remt, like that 
strictly in rem, affects the jural relations of all persons, not merely those 
of the present owner; for in each case the "transfer of title" involves, 
as regards all persons, the extinguishment of their duties to the present 
owner in respect to the particular object involved and the creation of 
new and corresponding duties to the new owner. 
" Of course, even where a judgment in personal is sought, property 
may be attached ab initio and subsequently sold to satisfy the judgment. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 17:35:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 763 
The point that the primary rights may be in rem, although the 
vindication proceedings are in personam in the special sense that 
such phrase has in the present context, is often brought out in 
admiralty cases. Thus: 
1907, Mr. Justice Holmes, in The Hamilton: 
"We pass to the other branch of the first question: 
whether the state law, being valid, will be applied in the 
admiralty. Being valid, it created an obligation, a personal 
liability of the owner of the Hamilton, to the claimants. 
Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co., I94 U. S. 120, I26. 
This, of course, the admiralty would not disregard, but 
would respect the right when brought before it in any 
legitimate way. Ex parte McNeil, I3 Wall. 236, 243. It 
might not give a proceeding in rem, since the statute does 
not purport to create a lien. It might give a proceeding 
in personam."10'5 
Let us now suppose, in the Blackacre case, that instead of 
suing at law (after B has committed a destructive trespass), A 
secures from an equity court, ab initio, an injunction against B. 
The decree of the court here (end of "primary stage" of the 
equitable proceeding) would result in imposing a (new) duty 
on B not to trespass on Blackacre; and, correlatively, A would 
have a (new) equitable right.108 This first stage of the equitable 
proceeding would be in personam in the same general sense that 
the primary stage of the law court's is in personam. If B fails 
to fulfil the negative duty imposed by the injunction, there will 
ordinarily occur a "secondary stage," resulting in imprisonment 
for contempt. So far as this is said to be "enforcement" or 
procedure in personal, it involves a different and more literal 
use of the phrase in personal than in any of the instances pre- 
viously considered.'07 But the point for special emphasis here is 
(105(907) 207 U. S. 398, 405. 
0 Compare Fall v. Eastin (I909) 215 U. S. I, 14-15 (concurring opinion 
of Holmes, J.); Mallette v. Carpenter (I9i6) i6o N. W. (Wis.) 182; see 
extended comment in (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 31I. 
See also The Relations between Equity and Law (1913) II MICH. L. 
REV. 537, 567-568. 
1 For a summary of the different uses of the pair -of phrases, in 
personam and in rem, see ante, PP. 714-715. 
For a comparison of imprisonment in an action at law, under a capias 
ad respondendum or capias ad satisfaciendum, with imprisonment for 
contempt in a chancery suit, for the purpose of coercing performance of 
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that A's primary rights in rem are now being vindicated exclu- 
sively by equitable proceedings that are in personal in one sense 
so far as the primary stage is concerned and in personal in a 
different sense so far as the secondary stage is concerned. 
On what possible ground, therefore, even assuming that equity 
could "act only in personam,"'08 could it be said that for that 
reason there could be no equitable primary rights in rem, i. e., 
multital rights? If the usual legal proceedings were abolished, 
and A could vindicate his Blackacre rights in rem only in equity, 
would they thereby cease to be rights in rem and become only 
rights in personam? 
Suppose, indeed, that we have a devise of Whiteacre to X for 
life, with remainder in fee to Y if, and only if, Y survives Z. 
Until Z's death before the death of X, Y has, obviously, only a 
contingent remainder. Let us assume, further, that T is threat- 
ening a destructive trespass to the premises, including the ruining 
of the mansion house. Y, the contingent remainderman, has no 
"legal" rights in rem, for he has no vested rights, etc., but only 
"possibilities"-i. e., potential rights, privileges, etc.109 
Has he not, however, actual, exclusively equitable rights in rem, 
that is, respective multital rights against T and other persons 
indiscriminately that they shall not seriously and permanently 
harm the estate.? There are numerous decisions to the effect that 
Y has an exclusively equitable right that the life tenant, X, shall 
a decree, see the thorough discussion by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, 
The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) I5 COL. L. REV. io8 ff. 
See also The Relations between Equity and Law (1913) II MICH. L. 
REv. 537, 564-567. 
' Such an assumption itself seems to be inaccurate and misleading in 
view of the power of a court of equity to issue writs of assistance and 
writs of sequestration. See Lord Hardwicke, in Penn v. Lord Baltimore 
(1750) I Ves. 444, 454, quoted ante, p. 714, n. II. The learned judge there 
refers to a proceeding under a writ of assistance as a means by which 
the "strict primary decree in personal" of a court of equity could some- 
times be "enforced in rem." 
Consider also the power of a court of equity to proceed in rem in 
mortgage foreclosure cases: extinguishment of the "equity of redemp- 
tion." Cf. Paget v. Ede (I874) L. R. i8 iq. II8. 
10 This statement should, in strictness, be qualified. 
Even at common law the contingent remainderman had the actual, or 
present, legal power to "release" his interest to the owner of the estate 
in possession. The power to devise, and the power to make a so-called 
"equitable assignment" should also be considered. 
Very generally the contingent remainderman now has, as a result of 
statute, the present legal power to alienate his potential interest inter vivos. 
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not commit "waste." It is clear, also, that the reasons are equally 
great for recognizing exclusively equitable rights against persons 
in general that they shall not harm the land and defeat the "legal" 
(i. e., concurrently legal and equitable) rights, privileges, etc., 
of the remainderman if his estate should ever vest "in interest" 
and, ultimately, in "possession and enjoyment,"-that is, exclu- 
sively equitable multital rights, or rights in rem; and the dicta 
in the cases relating to waste afford strong support to this con- 
clusion.110 Similarly, suppose that J conveys the absolute legal 
title of Greenacre to K to secure a debt of $ioooo, the agreement 
being that K is to be entitled to possession until the maturity of 
the debt and that when the debt is paid K is to reconvey the 
absolute legal title to J. While K is thus in possession, M threat- 
ens to cut down the ornamental trees on the place. If the 
threatened acts were committed, J would of course have no legal 
remedy, since the "legal" rights in rem, (i. e., rights concurrently 
legal and equitable)"' are now vested in K. It would, however, 
seem clear on principle that J is entitled to an injunction against 
M-,112 or, in other words, that J has exclusively- equitable multital 
rights, or rights in rem, relating directly to the physical corpus of 
1 Compare the following statements from judicial opinions: 
Mr. Justice Battle, in Braswell v. Morehead (1852) 45 N. C. 26, 28: 
"Owners of executory bequests, and other contingent interests, 
stand in a position, in this respect, similar to vested remaindermen, 
and have a similar right to the protective jurisdiction of the Court" 
(i. e., court of chancery). 
Mr. Justice Connor, in Latham v. Roanoke, etc., Co. (0905) 51 S. E. 
(N. C.) 780: 
"The interest of a contingent remainderman in the timber will 
be protected by a court of equity by injunction." 
Mr. Justice Shaw, in Pavkovitch v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (I9o6) ISO 
Cal. 39, 50: 
"The plaintiff's interest is not vested (Civ. Code, secs. 693, 695); 
and hence he has no present property in the rock removed, for the 
value of which damages can be computed, or to which he could 
have the right of present possession. . . . But the rule is dif- 
ferent with regard to the equitable remedy by injunction. The 
owner of a contingent interest may protect that interest against 
deterioration or destruction by enjoying a threatened waste." 
l"iFor the classification of jural relations as "concurrently legal and 
equitable" and "exclusively equitable," see The Relations Between Equity 
and Law (1913) II MICH. L. REV. 537. 
'Smith v. Collyer (x8o3) 8 Ves. 89, seems to have been such a case. 
The injunction was, to be sure, refused by Lord Eldon,-solely on the 
ground, however, that at that time bills to enjoin a "trespass" as dis- 
tinguished from "waste' had not yet been definitely sanctioned by the 
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the property. The nature of the equitable rights, privileges, 
powers, and immunities of the cestui que trust is too large a sub- 
ject for adequate treatment in the present place; and so any 
further consideration of that interesting subject must be reserved 
for another occasion."13 It is hoped, however, that the various 
classes of rights and remedies already discussed are sufficient to 
show that the intrinsic nature of substantive primary rights- 
whether they be rights in rem or rights in personam-is not 
dependent on the character of the proceedings by which they may 
be vindicated."' 
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD 
YALE UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW. 
court. Counsel for plaintiff argued: "The plaintiffs have no means of 
preventing or redressing this at law, the mortgagee having the legal title; 
and the mischief will be irremediable." Lord Eldon replied: "I do not 
recollect any instance of this sort. . . . It is not waste, but trespass by 
their own showing. There was no instance of an injunction in trespass 
till the case before Lord Thurlow upon a mine; to which I have alluded; 
which, though trespass, was very near waste. In that case, the first 
instance of granting an injunction in trespass, there was no dispute 
whatsoever about the right. Here the right is disputed." 
See also Mr. Justice Brewer, in Wilson v. Rockwell (i886) 29 Fed. 674: 
"The facts stated in the bill give complainants a clear right to a 
preliminary injunction. It is immaterial whether the legal title 
be in complainants or the Woodmass of Alston Company. The 
dispute between them does not concern trespassers. Both parties 
are in court, the company being made defendant. The full equitable 
title or ownership is with complainants, and a court of equity will 
protect the owners, as against trespassers, although the location of 
the legal title has not been finally determined." 
In such a case as that relating to mortgagor and mortgagee, the situa- 
tion is not fundamentally different from that of In re Nisbet & Potts' 
Contract [i906] I Ch. 386-a case indicating that the equitable beneficiary 
of a restrictive agreement relating to land (sometimes called an "equitable 
easement") has rights even against wrongful possessors, or disseisors, 
of the "servient" land that they shall not act contrary to the terms of 
the restrictive agreement. In the latter case, as in that of the mortgagor 
and mortgagee, the legal owner of the land on which the acts of the 
defendant are done is not the equitable "agent" or "guardian" of the 
equitable beneficiary; and hence the grounds are peculiarly strong for 
giving to the equitable beneficiary direct equitable rights against all persons 
in respect to the physical corpus. 
113 See The Relations between Equity and Law (1913) II MICH. L. REv. 
537, where the writer has sought to analyze most of the elements comprised 
in the interest of a cestui que trust. 
See also Supplemental Note on the Conflict of Equity and Law, post, 
pP. 767 ff. 
114 Compare Bacon, Uses (Circa i602) Rowe's ed., pp. 5-6; "So that usus 
& status, sive possession, potius different secundum rationed fori, quam 
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SUPPLEMENTAL NOTE ON THE CONFLICT OF EQUITY 
AND LAW 
In the article on The Relations between Equity and Law (19I3) II 
MICH. L. REV. 537 (see footnote II3, page 766) the present writer has 
sought to show that the interest of a cestui que trust constitutes a complex 
aggregate of exclusively equitable rights, privileges, powers, and immu- 
nities (some of these being in rem, or multital, and some of them in 
personam, or paucital); also that, in order to appreciate clearly the 
exact nature of all these jural elements it is necessary to consider defi- 
nitely the "conflict" of the "legal" and the "equitable" relations involved 
and to discover the net residuum derived from a "fusion" of law and 
equity. 
As implied by what has just been stated, the article above cited takes 
the position that while many substantive equitable rules are entirely con- 
sistent with legal rules, many other substantive equitable rules (i. e., those 
relating to the so-called "exclusive jurisdiction" and "auxiliary juris- 
diction" of equity) are in conflict with so-called legal rules,-the latter 
being pro tanto "repealed," and rendered as invalid as statutes that 
have been repealed by a subsequently enacted constitution. 
It was, indeed, one of the purposes of the article to take strict issue 
with the thesis of such scholars as Professors Langdell, Ames, Maitland, 
and Stone (I2 COL. L. REV. 756) that there is no conflict at all between 
substantive legal and equitable doctrines or, according to Maitland, only 
one or two possible instances of such conflict. 
Professor Austin W. Scott, in a very recent article entitled The Nature 
of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (19I7) I7 COL. L. REV. 269, 275, 
endorses, in part, the position of the present writer as set forth in the 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, saying: 
"Professor Ames has said that it is clearly inaccurate to say that 
the cestui que trust is the equitable owner of the trust property, 
because the trustee is the owner 'and, of course, two persons with 
adverse interests cannot be owners of the same thing.' Professor 
Maitland suggests that the cestui que trust cannot be regarded in 
equity as the owner of the trust property, because the law regards 
the trustee as the owner and it would be inconceivable chaos, 
'civil war and utter anarchy,' if law and equity should conflict. 
Now it is probably true that law and equity sometimes do conflict." 
(Italics are those of present writer.) 
secundum natural rei, for that one of them is in court of law, the other 
in court of conscience." 
Compare also Lord Dunedin, in Nocton v. Ashburton [I9I4] A. C. 
932, 964: 
"And then there are the duties which arise from a relationship 
without the intervention of contract in the ordinary sense of the 
term, such as the duties of a trustee to his cestui que trust or of a 
guardian to his ward. It is in this latter class of cases that equity 
has been peculiarly dominant, not, I take it, from any scientific 
distinction between the classes of duty existing and the breaches 
thereof, but simply because in certain cases where common justice 
demanded a remedy, the common law had none forthcoming, and 
the common law (though there is no harder lesson for the stranger 
jurist to learn) began with the remedy and ended with the right." 
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But immediately after the sentence last quoted, Professor Scott says: 
"But do they really conflict in this particular case? Is it not 
really the fact that both law and equity regard the trustee as the 
legal owner, and that both law and equity regard the cestui que trust 
as the equitable or beneficial owner? Of course the question who is 
equitable or beneficial owner is not generally one with which a 
court of law is concerned. But even in Bacon's day a court of 
law did sometimes concern itself with that question, and when it 
did it recognized that it was the cestui que trust who is the beneficial 
owner. (Bacon, Reading on Statute of Uses. *7)" 
No extended reply can be made here; but, with deference, it is sub- 
mitted that the learned writer's position is untenable and that his refer- 
ence to Bacon betrays a failure to understand the real nature of the 
analysis and argument relating to the "conflict" of equity and law. 
The examples given by Bacon,-e. g., that "if cesty que use had resold 
his use unto the feoffee for six pounds, or contracted with a stranger 
for like sum, there is no doubt but it is a good condition or contract 
whereon to ground an action upon the case: for money for release of a 
suit in chancery is a good quid pro quo,"-instead of supporting Professor 
Scott's view, seem to sustain exactly the opposite conclusion. It is true 
enough that, in the purely collateral manner indicated by Bacon, even the 
court of law recognizes the equitable rights of the cestui que trust, and, 
as Professor Scott puts it, "regards the cestui que trust as the equitable 
or beneficial owner." But that purely collateral result necessarily means 
that the law court recognized: (i) that there was a "conflict" between 
the "legal rules" according to which the cestui had no rights or privileges 
and the equitable rules according to which the cestui had very substantial 
rights, privileges, etc.; and (2) that as to such "conflict" the equitable 
rules were, substantively considered, paramount and valid to the exclusion 
and "repeal" of the (preexisting) substantive (legal) rules. In other 
words, the law courts took a view in accordance with jural realism as 
distinguished from nominalism and fiction. 
Let us go back to some period prior to i400 A. D. when equity had not 
yet recognized any interest in the cestui que use. C conveys Blackacre 
to T with the agreement that T shalt "hold" to the use of, or in trust 
for, C. 
(i) Under the common law, T had the privileges of using and wasting 
the land, or in other words, had no duties to refrain from doing these 
things; and, correlatively, C had no rights against T that he should not 
use or waste the land.. Let us assume now that a statute had been enacted 
providing, (a) that thereafter the trustee, instead of having the privilege 
of wasting the land, should be under a duty to the cestui not to waste it; 
(b) that such duty could be "enforced" by the cestui, not in the then 
existing courts of law, but in a new court specially created for the purpose. 
Would anyone doubt that the statute conflicted, substantively, with the 
common-law rules, and repealed them-even though, of course, if C 
applied to the regular law courts for relief against T, it would be refused? 
In this matter we may well compare the many Workcmen's Compensation 
Acts effecting important changes in the substantive law and at the same 
time establishing special tribunals (akin to the early courts of equity) for 
"enforcing" the law as thus modified. 
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(2) Under the common-law rules of the early period referred to, C, 
the cestui que use, would have no privilege of entering on Blackacre, or 
actually using it, or in other words C would be under a duty to stay off; 
and, correlatively, T would have a "legal" right that C should stay off. 
But let us assume that a statute is passed providing, (a) that a cestui 
should have the privileges of entering on the land and using it, that is, 
should have no duties to stay off, etc.; and (b) that if T were to assert 
any supposed right against C by suing in a regular court of law, the 
"defensive" remedy of C should consist, not in presenting some form of 
legal pleading, etc., to the ordinary court of law, but in securing from a 
new court specially created for the purpose an injunction against T 
restraining him from continuing his action at law, etc. 
Would anyone doubt that such statute conflicted substantively with the 
common-law rules and repealed the latter,-and that, too, even though the 
statutory rule was to be "enforced," or vindicated, in the roundabout 
(though practically effective) manner specially provided? 
Finally, if, after these two statutes, the law courts took notice, in some 
purely collateral way such as that mentioned by Bacon, that C had a 
substantial jural interest in Blackacre, would such recognition argue that 
there was no conflict between the substantive common-law rules and the 
substantive statutory rules; or would it mean exactly the opposite? 
These questions can be answered in only one way: and it would seem 
clear that the precise equivalents of these supposed statutory changes 
have been brought about by equitable repeals of substantive common-law 
doctrines,-with, however, this difference: that such repeals were cov- 
ered and almost concealed by fictions That is to say, the chancellor, 
from solid considerations of expediency, acted constantly under the fiction 
of not affecting the common-law doctrines at all: "Every jot and every 
tittle of the law was to be obeyed I" (Maitland actually believed that: 
Lect. on Eq. I7.) All of the "legal" rights, privileges, etc., of the 
trustee were to "continue" as before, but he was to "hold" them for 
the benefit of the cestui que trust. (For the use of the term "hold" as 
applied to trusts, see Maitland, Equity (I9o9) I7; Langdell (1887) I 
HARV. L. REV. 59, 62; (1900) I3 HARV. L. REV.; Ames (i887) I HARV. L. 
REV. 3, 9, II; Stone (I9I2) I2 COL. L. REV. 756, Law and its Administra- 
tion (19I5) 96-97; A. W. Scott (19I7) I7 COL. L. REV. 275, 282, 290.) 
Lord Mansfield has said that in legal matters nothing is so likely to 
mislead as a metaphor (see ante, p. 71I, n. 4) ;-and here the metaphor 
consists of "holding." One may literally "hold" a physical object for 
another person without the destruction or alteration of the object. But 
how is it when a trustee "holds" an aggregate of "legal" relations for 
the benefit of another? 
How is it when a trustee "holds" a "legal' privilege of cutting 
ornamental trees with an "equitable" duty of not cutting ornamental 
trees ? 
Compare Lord Hardwicke in Robinson v. Litton (I744) 3 Atk. i83, i84: 
"If the defendant has a legal right" [i. e., privilege], "and there 
are no equitable circumstances to restrain hire, I shall not do it 
But though he may have a legal right" [ i. e., privilege] "yet if 
there are equitable circumstances he may be restrained, and it is not 
56 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.108 on Thu, 30 May 2013 17:35:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
770 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
proper for me to give a liberty" [i. e., privilege] "in doubtful 
cases." 
Compare also Lord Eldon, in Marquis of Devonshire v. Sandys (i8oi) 
6 Ves. io7, I09, II4: 
"When this court took upon itself to depart from the rule of law 
as to waste, and interpose its restraining power, upon what is 
called equitable waste, beyond the rule of -law, one duty at least was 
imposed upon the Court; to define with precision and accuracy, 
in what cases the Court would interpose. 
"This at least is clear; that Lady Sandys, claiming an estate for 
life without impeachment of waste, upon the deed in general, must 
be understood upon the deed to claim that estate with such powers 
as the law of the land, administered in a court of law, subject to 
such restraints to which that law is subject, as administered in a 
court of equity, gives her, as to felling timber; and neither party 
can allege surprise in finding their legal rights" [i. e., legal privi- 
leges] "affected by those restraints." 
And what of a trustee "holding" a "legal right, or claim" that the 
cestui shall not cut ornamental trees, with, however, an "equitable 
no-right" in the trustee, or in other words "an equitable privilege" in the 
cestui? (See (09I3) II MICH. L. REV. 537, 555, 569-57I; Jones v. 
Tankerville [I909] 2 Ch. 440, 443, per Parker, J., now Lord Parker of 
Waddington; Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd. [I9I5] I K. B. I; and 
comment (I9I7) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 395-399.) 
In Jones v. Tankerville, supra, Lord Parker said: 
"An injunction restraining the revocation of a license, when it is 
revocable at law, may in a sense be called relief by way of specific 
performance, but it is not specific performance in the sense of com- 
pelling the vendor to do anything. It merely prevents him from 
breaking his contract, and protects a right" [i. e., privilege] "in 
equity which but for the absence of a seal would be a right at law, 
and since the Judicature Act it may well be doubted whether the 
absence of a seal in such a case can be relied on in any court." 
The fictions of the chancellor were not the less precisely such merely 
because the common-law judges generally acquiesced in the verbal pre- 
tense that all "legal relations" continued valid, as before. They realized, 
to be sure, what was happening (see Moyle, J., in Y. B. 4 Ed. IV (i464) 
fol. 7, pl. 9: "That cannot be in this court as I have told you, for the 
common law of the land varies in this case from the law of chancery," 
etc.); but the fiction was all the more convenient because the struggle 
for supremacy was not finally given up by the law judges until the 
prerogative decree of James I, i6i6 A. D., in the struggle between Coke 
and Ellesmere. 
It would now, however, seem time to recognize this venerable fiction 
as such, and to see through it to the ultimate jural realities. That much 
is demanded if we are to have exact and adequate analysis; and correct 
analysis, it must be remembered, is in this case, as in others, essential 
to the clear apprehension of the important teleological aspects of the 
various jural problems involved. 
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD. 
YALE UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW. 
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